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Democracy promotion has been a principal foreign policy goal of the United 
States in the post-Cold War world.  Democratic expansion is seen as an essential element 
of enhanced security and stability throughout the world.  Jordan, having begun its own 
democratization program in 1989, has been a major recipient of U.S. security assistance 
since the end of the 1991 Gulf War.  This thesis explores the question of whether U.S. 
security assistance has helped or hindered democratization in Jordan.  It accomplishes 
this through an examination of the military aid received and the specific nature of civil-
military relations in Jordan, particularly during the democratization program and its 
subsequent rollback.  This thesis concludes that, counter to declared U.S. policy, U.S. 
security assistance to Jordan has effectively helped to limit democratization in Jordan 
through the empowerment of anti-democratic elements in Jordan.  The findings present 
challenges to further democratization in Jordan that will be difficult to surmount.  A 
conditional foreign aid program would encourage further political reform in Jordan that 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on foreign aid to 
further its national interest and foreign policy objectives.  Beginning in the 1990’s, 
democracy promotion became an integral component of US foreign policy and thus a 
major goal of U.S. foreign assistance.  In the years inclusive of this study, U.S. foreign 
policy and foreign aid attempted to promote democracy both directly and indirectly in 
developing countries, although its success remains questionable.   
Although the current Bush Administration has not promoted democracy as 
explicitly as the previous two administrations, in March 2002, President George W. Bush 
created the Millennium Challenge Account, which seeks to provide conditional foreign 
aid by rewarding good governance, improved health and education, and sound economic 
policy that supports economic growth and poverty reduction.  Furthermore, many U.S. 
policy makers are advocating an increase in foreign aid to reduce poverty and promote 
stability and democracy in support of the global war on terrorism.  Although the U.S. 
foreign policy has transformed with each administration, democracy promotion remains a 
key tenet. 
The subject of this thesis more narrowly questions whether democracy is 
attainable in Jordan with the aid of U.S. security assistance.  Does security assistance 
inhibit, promote, or have no impact on democracy in Jordan?  This thesis aims to test the 
hypothesis that security assistance inhibits further democratic reform in Jordan.  Do 
failures of democratic reform mean that foreign aid is absolutely and solely responsible 
for this democratic retreat?  It would be difficult to argue that foreign aid effects 
democratization positively or negatively in absolute terms because of numerous 
intervening variables.  Therefore, this thesis will attempt to test whether or not aid is an 
enabling factor.   
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is of significant interest due to the fact that 
such a seemingly small and inconsequential nation ranked third among nations receiving 
U.S. security assistance throughout most of the last decade.  Jordan’s historic dependency 
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on foreign aid since its creation in the 1920’s leads one to inquire about its effectiveness.  
Despite the wealth of scholarship on foreign aid, there remains a void with a focus on the 
efficacy of U.S. security assistance to Jordan. 
Some supporters of foreign aid maintain that it promotes stability while opponents 
opine that foreign aid props up despotic regimes and hinders democratic development.  
The U.S. Agency for International Development lists economic growth, the expansion of 
democracy and free markets, and conflict prevention among the main goals of foreign 
assistance.  Other proponents of foreign aid maintain that security assistance promotes 
regional stability, a dependency on the United States for parts and maintenance, and 
economic benefits to the defense industry.1  However, security assistance that promotes 
stability and fails to advocate political reform will not likely attain political liberalization.  
If the spread of democratic values are secondary or contradictory to other U.S. foreign 
policy goals, it will likely deny necessary reforms for democracy abroad.  Therefore, the 
success of democracy promotion in Jordan is questionable since democratic reforms have 
gradually retreated as foreign assistance continues to rise.    
Among the opponents of foreign aid, Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson argue 
that security assistance supports authoritarianism and repression rather than democracy 
and human rights.2  Others argue that arms transfers in particular facilitate coups, inhibit 
democracy, and thus provide insecurity.3  Do these arguments hold validity in Jordan?  It 
is the intention of this thesis to test whether this is indeed the case in Jordan.  U.S. foreign 
aid programs have received considerable criticism for supporting repressive, authoritarian 
governments such as Egypt.  Jordan, however, is not associated with repression or 
authoritarianism relative to other Middle East states and is therefore often labeled as 
                                                 
1 Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O’Connor and Jason D. Ellis.  Send Guns and Money: Security 
Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997) pp. 127-128. 
2 Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson.  Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian 
Regimes Abroad (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981) p. 4. 
3Talukder Maniruzzaman, “Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992) and Shannon Lindsey Blanton, “The 
Role of Arms Transfers in the Quest for Human Security,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 




“moderate”, or pro-west.  Thus, since Jordan is one of the few examples in the Middle 
East with democratic reform, it accentuates the notion that security assistance may 
counteract the forces necessary for democracy to take hold even with a “moderate” and 
pro-western monarchy. 
In order to test whether security assistance inhibits democratization in Jordan, it is 
imperative to identify the quantitative data and analyze the various funds and weapons 
transferred to Jordan and their rationale.  Additionally, it is also important to analyze the 
effect of these funds on the Jordanian economy to determine whether Jordan remains a 
distributive state and whether security assistance promotes economic and political reform 
or simply postpones it.  The analysis will focus mainly on the military since it receives a 
large portion of the security assistance and, more significantly, it remains the key 
constituent of the monarchy’s power.  Ultimately, due to this relationship between the 
monarchy and the military, it is crucial to assess the prospects for a transition towards 
democracy. 
Chapter II will identify Jordan’s dependency on foreign aid and the distributive 
nature of the economy.  It will also assess whether a direct or indirect correlation exists 
between potential crisis in Jordan and the amount of U.S. security assistance given.  
Finally, it will analyze the relationship between political or economic crisis, U.S. security 
assistance increases, and the retreat of democratic reform in Jordan.  This chapter will 
utilize primary and secondary source material on security assistance funds and economic 
data.  Although most data on U.S. security assistance is available, transfers of weapons 
worth $14 million or less are not publicly available.  Therefore, it is difficult to trace 
precisely how the Jordanian government spends the funds.  The usage of secondary 
literature will also aid the analysis to determine the impact on the economy and military. 
Chapter III explores how security assistance might enable the retreat of 
democratization by examining which domestic constituency in Jordan benefits most from 
security assistance.  This chapter looks at the historic ethnic demography of the Jordanian 
military and the mutual distrust between Jordanians and Palestinians using secondary 
literature.  The term Jordanian will be used to identify individuals of Transjordanian 
origin such as Circassians and Bedouins, both of which are linked to the identity of the 
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Jordanian army.  The term Palestinian will be used to identify Arabs from Mandatory 
Palestine and those who became Jordanian nationals after the unification of the West and 
East Banks in 1950.4 
  It will be assessed whether Jordanians remain the political-military elite or 
whether the military demography has changed throughout history simultaneous with the 
influx of Palestinian citizens.  It is also significant to determine whether the Jordanian 
military transformed into a more professional military, inclusive of Palestinian soldiers.  
Finally, this chapter will explore the impact of security assistance on an ethnically 
divided military and the consequences for democracy.  The demography of Jordan and 
the military in particular, is a closely held state secret and therefore presents a challenge 
as a means to test the commonly held belief that Jordanians control the military.  Current 
census data that identifies ethnic cleavages are unavailable.  Therefore, primary source 
data of key military leadership in the Jordanian military are central to determine who 
controls the military and, more significantly, who benefits most from security assistance.   
Chapter IV serves to answer why a bolstered monarchy and Jordanian-controlled 
military would likely postpone political liberalization indefinitely.  Since the signing of 
the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and the resultant “peace dividend”, Jordan has 
gradually rolled back its democratization process begun in 1989.  Analysis on the role of 
the military and its response to political liberalization will use the framework of civil-
military literature.  Finally, an assessment will conclude whether security assistance plays 
a determining factor in the transition towards democracy.  It is normative to suggest that 
aid hinders democracy because it assumes that the Hashemite monarchy desires 
democratic reform.  Based on the history of Jordan, it is feasible that the regime would 
shift alliances away from the United States rather than succumb to reformist policies. 
Chapter V will offer conclusions and policy implications for the United States.  
This thesis is of interest to policy makers and advocates of foreign aid, as well as scholars 
and students of the Middle East and civil-military relations. 
 
                                                 
4 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace 
Process (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. xv. 
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II. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, 1989-2002 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will set the context for the thesis through analysis of the United 
States policy regarding military aid to Jordan.  This analysis will serve to answer the 
following questions.  How does U.S. security assistance provide stability and security to 
Jordan?  Does U.S. policy succeed at its stated objectives or does it perpetuate Jordan’s 
distributive economy?   
To answer these questions, this chapter will analyze U.S. policy towards Jordan, 
explain its economic structure, analyze U.S. security assistance data, and use historical 
examples to explain Jordanian and U.S. responses to crisis in Jordan.  During the years of 
this study, the United States was the primary supplier of military aid to Jordan.  
Therefore, the primary focus of this paper will be the finances granted to the Jordanian 
military since it serves as the bedrock of the Hashemite monarchy.      
B. U.S. POLICY 
Before determining the effects of military aid on the democratization process in 
Jordan, it is imperative to explore U.S. policy towards Jordan during this period.  In order 
to make a generalization about U.S. policy to Jordan over the last ten years it is important 
to determine whether or not this policy has changed over the span of the last decade.   
The national security strategies of all Presidential administrations since 1990 
included elements of democracy promotion.  However, beginning with the Bush 
administration, the 1990 national security strategy denoted more lenient goals of 
democracy promotion towards the Middle East.  This document gives a token nod to 
democracy in the Middle East, simply stating, “We will also encourage regional states to 
evolve toward greater political participation and respect for human rights.”5  Democracy 
promotion reached its peak during the Clinton Administration making it one of the three 
main pillars of its national security strategy.  This Administration focused on democracy 
promotion more prominently and explicitly than previously, although once again the 
                                                 
5 U.S. National Security Council, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” August, 1991. 
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Middle East component of the 1995 national security strategy fails to list democracy 
promotion as a goal in that region.6  Not surprisingly, the security of Israel and 
maintenance of the free flow of oil remained two of the key tenets of U.S. security policy 
in Middle East.  In 1997, the Clinton Administration added a sentence to the Middle East 
regional strategy that reads, “We will encourage the spread of democratic values 
throughout the Middle East and Southwest and South Asia and will pursue this objective 
by a constructive dialogue with countries in the region.”7  From 1998 onward, the Clinton 
Administration expanded this one sentence slightly to encourage democratic values, rule 
of law, political participation, and human rights in the Middle East.8  In reality, the goals 
of democracy promotion in the Middle East were mainly rhetorical even during the 
Clinton years. 
President George W. Bush administration’s National Security Strategy does not 
offer a major transformation regarding democracy promotion.  The 2002 document 
promoted democracy and challenged nations to reform democratically in return for 
greater foreign aid, however this strategy did not specifically target the Middle East.  
Furthermore, the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account potentially provides the 
greatest challenge to the Middle East, which may see very little of the funds due to the 
lack of democratic reform.  The current administration places the most pressure on 
Palestine, Iraq, and even Iran to conform to democracy, however Jordan and other Middle 
Eastern states that have strong relations with the United States are able to avoid reformist 
policy.  
The U.S. State Department and U.S. military policies obviously reflect the 
national policy and do not present a significant departure.  However, U.S. State 
Department documents do reveal more accurately U.S. foreign policy with Jordan.  The 
State Department website reads: 
A primary objective of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Gulf 
war, has been the achievement of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace 
Jordan's constructive participation in the Madrid in the Middle East.                                                   
6 Ibid, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” February 1995. 
7 Ibid, “A National Security Strategy for A New Century,” May, 1997. 
8 Ibid, “A National Security Strategy for A New Century,” 1998-2000. 
 6
peace process is key in achieving peace.  U.S. policy seeks to reinforce 
Jordan's commitment to peace, stability, and moderation.  The peace 
process and Jordan's opposition to terrorism parallel and indirectly assist 
wider U.S. interests.  Accordingly, through economic and military 
assistance and through close political cooperation, the United States has 
helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity.9  
This policy of peace and stability in Jordan is complementary to Israeli security, which is 
one of the dominant goals of U.S. policy in the Middle East.  Not surprisingly, the State 
Department does not mention promotion of democracy or reform in Jordan.  This is 
revealing since maintaining the peace with Israel is clearly a priority.  Once Jordan 
signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the primary objective of U.S. policy in Jordan 
sought to promote stability in order to prolong the peace.  U.S. Central Command’s 
(USCENTCOM) goals correspond similarly serving to protect, promote, and preserve 
free flow of energy resources and the maintenance of regional stability.10  
Therefore, one could deduce that democracy promotion has been a major goal of 
U.S. foreign policy over the past decade at least rhetorically, however the Middle East, 
and Jordan in particular, are an exception.  In examining the past foreign policy with 
Jordan there has been little promotion of reformist policy.  It should not be a surprise that 
this liberal ideology is not a focus at all in the Middle East and even with a pro-west 
nation such as Jordan.  Recently Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative, which promotes tailored economic, political, and educational 
reform in the Middle East.11  Time will tell if this initiative is merely more rhetoric or if it 
offers a shift towards a truly reformist policy.  Access to oil and Israeli security continue 
to be the preeminent focus of U.S. policy in the Middle East, while reformist policy 
brings with it the nefarious notion that anti-west, Islamist parties could come to power 
controlling oil resources and threatening Israeli security.  Consequently, military aid to 
Jordan is used to “promote peace and stability” through a policy of bolstering the regime 
in order to preserve the fragile and unpopular peace that exists with Israel.  Additionally, 
                                                 
9 Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Jordan,” (January 2002). 
10 U.S. Central Command, www.centcom.mil/aboutus/cinc_strategy.htm, (November 2002). 
11 Secretary of State Colin Powell, “The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative,” 
www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/WM180.cfm (December 12, 2002). 
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King Abdullah's' ultimate goal is the oft-stated regime preservation; he would likely resist 
a U.S. policy that demanded democratic reform.  
C.  ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES – THE RENTIER STATE 
Since its birth, Jordan has been reliant on foreign aid to provide approximately 50 
percent of its budget.12  This foreign aid is used as “rent” in order to maintain a 
distributive economy like that of the oil-rich Arab states.  Giacomo Luciani argues that 
oil rent in Arab countries perpetuates authoritarian governments making it difficult for 
these states to democratize.13  Through the rents, these states are able to “buy” supporters 
and quell opposition by distributing goods and services to the public.  The “reliance upon 
‘rent’ weakens a regime’s accountability to society, since it can function without 
extracting substantial revenues from domestic sources.”14  This provides a one-way flow 
of benefits and services from state to society without extracting taxes and without 
providing political representation as opposed to democratic system which provides a two-
way flow of tax extraction and electoral political representation.  In a rentier state, only a 
fiscal crisis resulting in higher taxes or reduced distributions could potentially encourage 
greater societal demand for democracy.15  However, “states that do not face a fiscal crisis 
and enjoy continuing access to exogenous rent will be able to postpone democratization 
indefinitely.”16  Thus, a rentier state confronted with a fiscal crisis is forced to liberalize 
or replace the rents from other sources. 
Laurie Brand extends this rentier model to Jordan’s foreign policy and argues that 
Jordan shifts alliances to fulfill external rents in order to respond to or prevent an 
economic crisis.  She labels this “budget security,” defined more specifically as “a state 
or leadership’s drive to ensure the financial flows necessary for its survival.”17  By 
                                                 
12 Laurie A. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations - The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 42. 
13 Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization,” in Ghassan 
Salame (ed.), Democracy without Democrats (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) pp. 130-152. 
14 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan”, Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn 99) p. 608. 
15 Luciani, p. 132. 
16 Luciani, p. 134. 
17 Brand, p. 277. 
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shifting alliances, Jordan is able to maintain external rents, prevent a fiscal crisis, and 
delay liberalization of its rentier structure. 













1991 283.2 1055.7 431.7 230.3 61.3 (91.9) 760.2 991.8
1992 238.8 1081.2 328.4 137.5 20.0 (30.0) 1108.9 1246.9
1993 258.6 1235.1 130.3 163.3 52.7 (74.9) 1119.0 1282.9
1994 272.0 1312.8 99.4 175.6 26.8 (38.1) 1161.5 1338.0
1995 296.0 1471.5 313.3 182.8 14.6 (20.6) 1331.1 1515.4
1996 283.3 1666.9 326.4 219.9 76.9 (108.4) 1364.0 1586.8
1997 301.0 1681.9 105.6 205.0 113.0 (159.4) 1311.8 1517.6
1998 336.0 1876.8 46.0 172.2 99.0 (139.6) 1421.5 1594.4
1999 347.0 1804.1 92.2 198.5 184.9 (260.7) 1528.7 1729.0
2000 356.0 1868.6 -58.2 240.2 335.6 (473.2) 1503.4 1746.8
Source: Adapted by author from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2001,  
* Economic and Military Assistance converted from current $.  Source: USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants – Greenbook,” http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html (September, 2000).  Exchange rates from 
Central Bank of Jordan, http://www.nis.gov.jo/nis/owa/get_table?main_code=5&sub_code=15 (December, 
2002). 
The table above highlights military expenditure and revenues from foreign 
governments received throughout the 1990's.  Grants to Jordan from the United States 
were increasingly significant throughout the 1990's as portrayed in graph below.   




































Source: Adapted by author from Table 1. 
Both Table 1 and Figure 1 show glaring discrepancies that the United States 
granted more funds to Jordan than the total it received from the entire international 
community in the year 2000.  This discrepancy could be due to definition problems based 
on the two sources used.  Differences of the time frame in which grants were received or 
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given or a conflict in calendar or fiscal years are logical reasons to explain this.  
Regardless, Figure 1 still depicts an undeniable trend of increasing reliance on U.S. 
foreign aid. 
1. The 1989 Crisis 
In 1989, the Hashemite monarchy confronted a fiscal crisis when it was unable to 
overcome declining foreign aid.  In support of the rentier model, this crisis was a result of 
diminishing external rents from Arab states throughout the 1980s and King Hussein 
initiated a top-down, state-driven approach to liberalization.  The inability to replace this 
foreign aid forced Jordan to reschedule debts and accept economic reform policies with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The IMF mandated an increase in taxes and the 
reduction of subsidies on fuel and other goods, which served to “buy” patronage from 
Jordanians.  In short, this fiscal crisis and the resultant IMF mandated economic reforms 
triggered violent riots in Ma’an.  King Hussein was unable to simply quash these riots 
since they involved traditional supporters of the regime.  Furthermore, since King 
Hussein was unable to secure financial assistance, he had no other option but to respond 
with parliamentary elections in order to quell the discontent.  Quintan Wiktorowizc 
writes, “…democratic reform in Jordan was initiated from above as a tactical strategy to 
maintain social control in the face of severe economic crisis.  Political change was driven 
by a stability imperative, not by a benevolent desire for enhanced political 
participation.”18  Similarly, Glenn Robinson defines this as “defensive democratization” 
or the ability to maintain regime survivability through “pre-emptive liberalizing strategies 
available to rentier states.”19  Despite their defensive nature, the parliamentary elections 
that followed were relatively free and fair, martial law was lifted, press restrictions were 
removed, and freedoms of assembly were granted. 
2. The Gulf Crisis 
Upon the beginning of the 1990 Gulf War, the United States offered to increase 
military and economic aid to Jordan in attempt to bribe Jordan into joining the U.S. led 
alliance against Iraq.  King Hussein was unable to join the coalition due to the Palestinian 
                                                 
18 Wiktorowicz, p. 607. 
19 Glenn Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 1998) p. 387. 
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majority that supported Saddam Hussein and an important Iraqi trade relationship.  
Consequently, King Hussein determined that the threat of joining the coalition was 
greater than losing security assistance from the United States.  In short, aid could not 
overcome the risk to the regime and Jordan failed to bandwagon with the United States.   
With declining rents, Jordan’s refusal to join the international coalition against 
Iraq during the Gulf War did not help its poor economic situation.  Since bribery did not 
work, the United States and other Arab states threatened to cut off Jordanian aid hoping 
that it would scare the King into joining the coalition.  Once again, King Hussein 
determined that the threat of joining the coalition was greater than losing the foreign aid 
from the United States.  Therefore, even the threat of removing the aid did not provide 
enough political leverage to persuade Jordan into joining the coalition. 
The Gulf War put Jordan in a difficult situation politically and economically.  
Politically, Jordan became outcast in the region because Kuwait and other Arab states 
were distraught that King Hussein did not come to the aid of Kuwait.  Economically, 
Saudi Arabia ceased sending oil to Jordan, the United States froze foreign aid payments, 
and unemployment increased from 15 to 20 percent.20  Furthermore, since Iraq was 
Jordan’s largest trading partner from 1986-89 and provided 82.5 percent of Jordan’s 
petroleum for the first three quarters of 1989,21 the sanctions on Iraq put a damper on this 
trade relationship.     
Due to this political climate created by Jordan’s increased taxes, decreased 
distribution of services to Jordanians, increased unemployment, and increased political 
voice of Islamists; King Hussein decided to abstain from the international coalition.  
Despite Jordan’s economic weakness and the necessity to replace lost rents, King 
Hussein was unwilling, or unable to overcome Iraqi popularity and suppress political 
voice at a juncture when Jordanians had more political participation.  Thus, the 
significance of 1989 riots led to the realization that the resultant liberalization actually 
threatened regime stability.  The political and financial constraints limited King 
                                                 
20 U.S. Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study," http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jotoc.html 
(November, 2002). 
21 Brand, p. 286. 
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Hussein’s ability to modernize the severely degraded military and security apparatus, 
maintain their privileges, and mitigate threats to the regime.  Brand elucidates, “Short of 
a massive transfer of assistance directed specifically at the army and internal intelligence, 
it probably would have been extremely difficult to prevent massive defections”.22  From 
this moment on, the Hashemite monarchy renewed its effort to maintain foreign aid in 
order to prevent domestic instability and further democratic reform.   
3. Transition from the Rentier Model? 
If the rentier state model has validity, the best method to inhibit political 
opposition to the monarchy is to continue this system.  Thus, restoration of foreign aid 
was imperative to prohibit a reoccurrence of the budgetary crisis of 1989.  Since King 
Hussein desired to avoid the bloody riots and resultant liberalization in 1989, the United 
States was able use the promise of reestablished foreign aid as political leverage and 
Hussein was more apt to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.  Consequently, the 
United States policy towards Jordan since then provides increased security assistance 
aimed at reinforcing Jordan's commitment to peace and stability in Jordan and the region. 
























% of  
Total 
Revenue 
1991 26.6% 23.2% 43.5% 66.7% 76.6% 
1992 14.5% 11.0% 26.3% 37.4% 88.9% 
1993 32.3% 12.7% 10.2% 22.9% 87.2% 
1994 15.3% 13.1% 7.4% 20.6% 86.8% 
1995 8.0% 12.1% 20.7% 32.7% 87.8% 
1996 35.0% 13.9% 20.6% 34.4% 86.0% 
1997 55.0% 13.5% 7.0% 20.5% 86.4% 
1998 57.5% 10.8% 2.9% 13.7% 89.2% 
1999 93.1% 11.5% 5.3% 16.8% 88.4% 
2000 139.7% 13.8% - 10.4% 86.1% 
Source: Adapted and computed by author from Table 1. 
*U.S. Grant figures from Table 1.  
If Jordan based its foreign policy on budget security and its rentier structure 
through the Gulf War, the question arises whether Jordan is still dependent on foreign aid 
                                                 
22 Brand, p. 291.   
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to maintain a distributive economy.  Table 2 above shows the percentages of external 
revenues and domestic revenues.  The total contribution of foreign grants and loans 
demonstrates Jordan's reliance on foreign aid.  This table also demonstrates that Jordan 
was increasingly dependent on U.S. grants while other foreign grants declined throughout 
the 1990's.  Additionally, since 1989, Jordan’s domestic revenue has risen dramatically 
particularly due to the increase in taxes.  Domestic revenue as a percentage of total 
revenue has remained above 85 percent for most of the 1990’s due to the IMF mandated 
reforms, as shown above in Table 2.  In contrast, from 1973-1988, domestic revenue 
reached 60 percent only twice maintaining an average of 50 percent.23  One may argue 
that the increase in domestic revenue enables Jordan to reduce their dependence on 
foreign aid.  However, if this were true then the increase of taxes would likely force 
government accountability creating greater demand for democratic representation.  Thus, 
this seems to be a potential scenario in the future and not an explanation of the past 
decade.   
Table 3 below portrays the dramatic increases in U.S. security assistance over the 
past decade, especially after 1995.  Although domestic revenue increased throughout the 
1990’s, military expenditure increased only modestly despite dramatic increases in U.S. 
military assistance (see Tables 1 and 3).  If domestic revenue and military aid increased 
considerably throughout the 1990’s, one would expect military expenditure to increase 
substantially as well.  However, military expenditure attained only modest increases over 







                                                 
23 Brand, p. 48. 
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Table 3.   Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan 1991-2002 ($ in millions) 
Military Assistance Fiscal 
Year (FY) 
Economic Support 
Funds (ESF) FMF IMET 
 
Totals 
1984 20.0 0 1.7 21.7
1985 100.0 0 1.9 101.9
1986 95.3 0 1.8 97.1
1987 111.0 39.9 2.0 152.9
1988 18.3 26.5 1.8 46.6
1989 15.2 10.0 1.8 27.0
1990 3.8 67.8 2.0 116.8
1991 35.0a 20.0b 1.3 56.3
1992 30.0b 20.0b .6 70.6
1993c 5.0 9.0 .5 44.5
1994d 9.0 9.0 .8 37.8
1995 7.2 7.3 1.0 37.2
1996 7.2 200.0e 1.2 237.3
1997f 112.2 30.0 1.7 152.1
1998f 150.0 75.0g 1.6 227.8
1999 150.0 70.0g 1.6 223.0
1999(Sup) 50.0 50.0 0 100.0
2000 150.0 75.0 1.7 228.2
2000(Sup) 50.0 150.0 0 200.0h
2001 150.0 75.0 1.7 228.4
2002 150.0 75.0 1.8 228.2
2003i 250.0 198.0 TBD 448.0
Source: Adapted by author from Alfred B. Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues” CRS: 
IB93085 (November 20, 2002) and USAID “U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants (Greenbook).”  
a. Suspended in April 1991, released in early 1993. 
b. Released in late July 1993. 
c. Restrictions on FY 1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993. 
d. FY 1994 funds released Jan. 13, 1994. 
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF 
under FY 1996 appropriation to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special 
drawdown authority. 
f. Figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the Middle East Peace and Stability Fund 
($100 million in FY 1997, $116 million in FY 1998). 
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority. 
h. Some of these funds to be obligated in future years (FY 2001 or 2002). 
i. Requests for FY 2003. 
Note: These figures do not include military loans or financing, debt relief listed in Table 5, or small 
amounts for de-mining assistance. 
According to a study by Khilji and Zampelli, U.S. military aid is perfectly 
fungible.24  Khilji and Zampelli conducted a study of major U.S. aid recipients, including 
Jordan, and concluded that U.S. military assistance enables recipients to release some of 
their own resources for non-military purposes that would have been allocated to military 
                                                 
24 Nasir M. Khilji and Ernest M. Zampelli, “The fungibility of U.S. military and non-military 
assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients,” Journal of Developmental Economics, 
Vol. 43 No. 2 (April 1994) pp. 345-362. 
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expenditures.25  Moreover, a major portion of this fungible military aid was channeled to 
the private sector via a tax relief mechanism.26  If Jordan takes some funds that would 
have been spend on military expenditure and uses it for tax relief, it lessens the need for 
political representation and thus it retains rentier characteristics.  Tax relief enables the 
regime to maintain patronage from society, while security assistance targets the loyalty of 
the military.  Thus, despite the increase in domestic revenue and consequently the 
decrease in foreign contributions to total revenue during this period (see Table 2), Jordan 
still relies on external aid to maintain regime security through a rentier structure.   
Daniel Brumberg argues that liberalization seen in the Arab world is not simply a 
survival strategy but rather a type of political system, which he labels a “liberalized 
autocracy”.27  This semiauthoritarian regime, or dictablanda, is a product of exposure to 
the American pursuit of democratic transition and the expanded flow of aid to reforming 
states.  Explaining this relationship Thomas Carothers writes,  
They come to crave the attention, approval, and money that they know 
democracy attracts from the Western international community.  As a 
result, their rule becomes a balancing act in which they impose enough 
repression to keep their opponents weak and maintain their own power 
while adhering to enough democratic formalities that they might just pass 
themselves off as democrats.28 
This strategy of liberalized autocracy permits the continuous flow of rents from the 
United States, where democracy is rhetorically linked to foreign policy.  Although this 
policy serves to prevent crisis by strengthening the military, it also appears to solidify the 




                                                 
25 Khilji and Zampelli, p. 358. 
26 Khilji and Zampelli, p. 361. 
27 Daniel Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(October 2002), p. 56. 
28 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Without Illusions,” Foreign Affairs, (January-February 1997) pp. 
90-91. 
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Table 4.   Arms Transfers to Jordan by Supplier ($ in millions of current dollars) 









1985-1989 460 1200 0 160 160 90 22
1987-1991 300 390 20 160 140 90 27
1991-1993 50 0 0 30 0 5 59
1993-1995 140 0 0 0 0 5 97
1995-1998 200 0 0 0 0 100 66
1998-2001 100 0 0 100 0 100 30
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 
(Washington D.C.) various editions; Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing 
Nations,” Congressional Research Service, various editions, (Washington, August 6, 2002).  Data rounded 
to nearest $100 million.  Major West European states include Britain, France, and Germany. 
*Calculated by author 
 
D. CRISIS AND RESPONSE -- U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States has been the largest 
donor of military aid to Jordan (see Table 4 above).  Thus, since aid from the United 
States is increasingly important relative to other foreign governments.  The empirical data 
and analysis below will portray that U.S. foreign aid is imperative to the survival of the 
Jordanian monarchy.  As Figure 2 below depicts, U.S. military and economic assistance 
reached two distinct climaxes in the past decade in response to political events that had 
the potential to destabilize the Jordanian regime. The first peak occurred following the 
Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994 due to the “peace dividend” and the delivery of 
various weapons promised following the signature of the treaty.  The second peak of 
security assistance follows the death of King Hussein in 1999.  Additionally, a third 
climax is currently underway.  The current spike in aid flows is a result of the global war 
on terrorism and the forthcoming war with Iraq.  Increased financial flows following all 
these events appear to bolster the regime through military modernization thus preventing 
further liberalization.  The following analysis will include Economic Support Funds 
(ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training 
(IMET), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) all in the form of grants as well as debt 











84 86 88 90 92











Source: Adapted by author from Table 3.  
^ 1991 and 1992 funds released in Jul 1993 
* Requested funds for FY 2003. 
** Includes Wye River supplemental funds and debt forgiveness listed in Table 5. 
 
1. 1994 Crisis and Response 
In 1994, Jordan confronted a large level of opposition domestically and regionally 
upon the signature of the non-belligerency agreement on July 25, 1994 and the 
subsequent peace treaty on October 26, 1994.  Since 1994, Jordan has been able to secure 
itself from opposition threats and further liberalization securing financial assistance from 
the United States.  In 1993, two days after Israel and Jordan reached an agenda for peace 
talks, the United States released foreign aid allocations suspended in 1991-92.  In 
addition to economic and military assistance, the U.S. promised to write-off over $700 
million in debt once the peace treaty was signed (see Table 5 below).  Of note, $309.9 
million of the debt relief incorporated military loans.29  Thus, the aggregate of these 
figures present a peak as depicted in Figure 2.  beginning in 1994.  The figures for 
economic and military assistance listed in Table 3 appear as if aid did not increase 
significantly until 1996.  However, this is due to U.S. budgetary process delays and 
furthermore the graph portrays funds according to fiscal year appropriations, and not the 
year released.   
                                                 
29 Alfred B. Prados, "U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues," Congressional Research Service, IB93085, 
(November 20, 2001) p. 12. 
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Table 5.   U.S. Debt Forgiveness for Jordan ($ in millions) 






1994 99 220 
1995 275 419 
1997-1998 27* 63 
Source: Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Relations and 
Bilateral Issues,” various editions. 
* Subsidy split as follows: $15 million in FY 
1997 funds, $12 million in FY 1998 funds. 
 
Due to the opposition of the peace treaty, one could question the motivation for 
King Hussein to formalize this treaty with Israel amidst opposition from other Arab 
states.  Was this simply an effort to align with the United States as the world’s hegemonic 
power?  This is highly unlikely since King Hussein did not simply bandwagon during the 
Gulf War.  On the contrary, Stephen M. Walt argues “a large aid relationship is more 
often the result of alignment than a cause of it.”30  Furthermore, he concludes that, 
“foreign aid can make an existing alliance more effective, but it rarely creates one in the 
absence of shared political interests.”31  Similarly, the King’s decision was based on the 
need to restore lost rents and the necessity to secure the regime.  The United States shared 
the interest of domestic stability in Jordan and preventing the Islamists from damaging 
relations with Israel. 
U.S. security assistance to Jordan following the peace treaty served several 
purposes.  First, one could interpret the finances as simply a reward for peace or “peace 
dividend.”  Second, aid enabled the channeling of finances to the public and private 
sectors benefit to provide continued patronage and quell opposition to the peace treaty.  
Third, the military assistance in particular could modernize military equipment and 
provide training to improve fighting capability.  Lastly, military assistance could fund 
higher salaries for military personnel to reward voluntary service and ensure loyalty to 
the regime.  To state that King Hussein signed the treaty solely to bandwagon with a 
superpower denies the fact that diminished external rents available before 1989 
necessitated replacement to provide regime security.   
Following the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the United States made a better 
effort to make improvements to the Jordanian military.  In addition to the economic and 
                                                 
30 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Vol. 
9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 28. 
31 Walt, p. 30. 
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military assistance and debt forgiveness listed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, Jordan 
became eligible in 1995 for lethal and non-lethal Excess Defense Authorizations.32  
Thereafter, used U.S. military equipment was transferable to Jordan at no cost. 
Additional significant events followed the treaty such as the restructuring of the 
Jordanian military, salary increases, and price reductions.  Based on recommendations 
from the U.S. Department of Defense in 1994, Jordan restructured the military to provide 
a lighter more mobile force focused primarily on border security and internal security.33  
Moreover, the military turned from a conscript to a volunteer force immediately 
following the signature of the peace treaty and the King granted a ten percent salary 
increase to military.34  These issues will be addressed in more depth in the next chapter, 
however, in general it is suffice to say that these measures promoted loyalty to the regime 
within the military.  In addition to the focus on the military, the King cut customs duties 
and luxury good prices and teachers received a salary increase.35  All these actions 
collectively promoted loyalty from the Jordanian-dominated public sector which remains 
the bastion of support for the monarchy.   
In an effort to enhance Jordan’s ability to maintain border security and implement 
the terms of the treaty, the United States awarded a $300 million military assistance 
package in 1996.  The package included assorted military equipment for the Jordanian 
Land Forces, Navy and Air Force issued through “drawdown” authority which grants 
excess equipment taken from the U.S. Department of Defense inventories.   
Jordan held relatively free and fair elections in 1989 and 1993, however 
simultaneous to the return of U.S. security assistance was a significant retreat in Jordan’s 
democratization process.  Once Jordan restored external rents and the peace negotiations 
with Israel began, the monarchy introduced changes to the electoral law, postponed 
parliamentary elections, clamped down on press freedoms and political parties, and 
ist-led anti-normalization campaign.  This reversal of cracked down on the Islam                                                 
32 Alfred B. Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation,” Congressional Research 
Service, 96-309F (April 5, 1996) p. 3. 
33 Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation,” p. 2. 
34 United Press International, “Jordan to increase government salaries,” June 5, 1994. 
35 Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” p. 405. 
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liberalization was unfortunate to the private-sector led by the Palestinian business 
community which would have benefited from greater economic liberalization.  
Furthermore, the fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF) boycotted the 1997 elections 
claiming unfair electoral changes.  The Jordanian regime was unable to alienate the East 
Bank Jordanians who dominate the public sector and serve as the bastion of support for 
the monarchy.  Thus, the public sector would have lost elite privilege in a more market-
oriented economy and democratic political structure.  In order for Jordan to maintain 
peace with Israel it had to create internal order by reversing the liberalization movement 
and cracking down on the opposition.36   
The monarchy responded to the 1989 fiscal crisis with defensive democratization; 
however the Jordanian military was now better equipped to quell any opposition with 
additional financial assistance.  Thus, opposition to the peace treaty and the bread riots in 
1996, which resulted from IMF austerity measures, was now containable with greater 
U.S. economic and military assistance.  Similarly, with the financial ability to restore the 
rentier structure and quell opposition, there was no longer a need for a liberalization 
process to secure the regime. 
2. 1999 Crisis and Response  
The second apex of U.S. security assistance to Jordan followed the death of King 
Hussein on February 8, 1999, as portrayed in Figure 2.  This political event was 
potentially destabilizing due to the transition of the regime from King Hussein to his son 
Abdullah.  Crown Prince Hassan made efforts to undermine King Hussein while he was 
out of the country, which led to a contentious battle for the throne.37  Once in position, 
King Abdullah had to secure the throne by establishing support within the military.  
Ultimately the increase in security assistance for this period served the same purposes to 
reward, or in this case demonstrate strong U.S. support for King Abdullah, to enable 
patronage to quell internal uprisings, to continue military modernization and ensure the 
loyalty of the military to the new king.   
                                                 
36 Glenn Robinson, Seminar: “Middle East Political Economy of the Peace Process,” Monterey, CA, 
Naval Postgraduate School (April 02). 
37 Details of this situation are included in Chapter 3. 
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Separate from the increase in security assistance following the death of King 
Hussein, the United States and Jordan made an additional bilateral effort to aid the 
Jordanian economy.  In September 2001, the United States and Jordan signed into law a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  This agreement demonstrates the priority of Jordanian 
security to the United States by providing the elimination of duties and commercial trade 
barriers.  Currently only Mexico, Canada, and Israel have a bilateral free trade agreement 
with the United States.  According to the former Jordanian Ambassador to the United 
States, Marwan Moasher, the FTA would help revive the Jordanian economy by easing 
unemployment, increasing foreign investment and bolstering the quality of exports.38 
On July 23, 2001, King Abdullah approved a new electoral law that lowers the 
voting age, increases membership in the lower house of parliament, and contains 
safeguards to prevent electoral fraud.  Originally parliamentary elections were scheduled 
for November 2001, however after consecutive postponements in order to allow enough 
time for these reforms to take place, it now appears elections will not occur until spring 
2003 at the earliest.39  What appears to be honest election reform can only be determined 
if elections take place.  The reforms may simply be a guise to delay elections indefinitely.  
Currently the growing dissatisfaction with the normalization of relations with Israel, the 
poor economic conditions, and the unrest over the pending U.S. led war with Iraq 
continue to threaten Jordanian stability.  As dissatisfaction grows, the regime is likely to 
repress liberalization even more in order to secure the regime and maintain peace with 
Israel. 
Following the transition of the monarchy to King Abdullah, Jordan’s military 
modernization continued to focus on internal and border security.  Essentially, much of 
the equipment acquired since 1999 functioned to sustain weapon systems already in 
possession.  Spare parts, ammo, and training can serve to keep the military loyal to some 
degree.  As Table 6 shows, the arms received by Jordan have been paltry with the 
exception of the F-16 fighters, attack helicopters, and tanks and even those are older 
generation weapons systems.  In the strategic picture, despite the increases in U.S. 
                                                 
38 Jordan Times, “US Trade pact gives ‘political, economic’ boost to Jordan,” 26 September 01. 
39 Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” (January 6, 2003) p. 3. 
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security assistance throughout the past decade, it has not resulted in any noteworthy 
improvement in the overall fighting capability of the Jordanian military.  Jordan remains 
surrounded by nations with stronger and larger militaries.  If Jordan’s military is unable 
to defend against external threats and it can only serve to fend off internal threats, the 
efforts to modernize the military are largely artificial.  If regime preservation is the only 
mission the Jordanian military is capable of, it remains praetorian rather than 
professional. 
Table 6.   U.S. Arms Assistance Received 
Year Supplier Details 
1992 United States 6 machine guns and 2 rocket launchers 
1993 United States 1 machine gun, 20 5-ton trucks, 1 commercial vehicle, 141 TOW anti-tank missiles 
1995 United States 18 UH-1 utility helicopters 
1996 United States 
50 M60A3 tanks, 18 UH-1H utility helicopters, 1 C-130H 
cargo aircraft,  2 40-foot personnel boats, 1 65-foot rescue 
boat, assorted vehicles, night vision devices, radios, 
ammunition, and support equipment 
1998 United States 12 F-16A fighter aircraft, 4 F-16B trainer jets, 100 AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, 50 AIM-7M air-to-air missiles 
1999 United States 24 HAWK air defense missile launchers and associated equipment, 9 UH-1F Cobra attack helicopters, and ammunition 
2000 United States 1 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and spare parts 
Source: Adapted by author from Alfred B. Prados, “Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation” p. 
4-5; Prados, “Jordan: US. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” pp. 13-14; Herb Phillips, “The Peace Falcon 
Program,” DISAM Journal Vol 21, No.1 (Fall, 1998) p. 107; Martin S. Indyk, “President’s Request for the 
Wye Support Package and the Question of Implementation of the Wye Agreement”, DISAM Journal, 
(Summer, 1999) p. 16; DSCA, EDA Database www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eda/search.asp (November, 
2001); Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Arms Sales Monitoring Project,” 
www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/index.html (November, 2001). 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The empirical data and the argument made above attempted to portray not only 
Jordan’s unremitting dependence on external aid, particularly U.S. financial assistance, 
but also the direct proportionality of aid distributions to potential crisis in Jordan.  If we 
understand that crisis is a catalyst for liberalization in a rentier state, then preventing a 
potential crisis through increased rents can also impair the liberalization process.  
Therefore, the U.S. policy of bolstering the Jordanian regime does little to promote 
reform despite providing temporary stability.  Although, it is unlikely that security 
assistance is the sole factor for the failure of further political liberalization, it has enabled 
Jordan to maintain a “liberalized autocracy”.   
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Wiktorowizc argues that reliance on foreign aid weakens regime accountability 
and progress towards democratization, however the increase in taxes from the IMF 
mandates have potentially forced a degree of accountability.40  The current dissension in 
Jordan could thus foreshadow further democratic demands.  Although, just as other 
rentier states have demonstrated, the demand for democracy does not guarantee 
democratic institutions or a successful transition to democracy.41 
Since 1993, U.S. security assistance has enabled Jordan to maintain its current 
path of failed liberalization.  Based on Jordan’s history of shifting alignments to provide 
regime security, the future is uncertain.  Thus far, the United States has successfully 
achieved the vague policy goal of Jordan stability through security assistance.  However, 
to base success on the perpetuation of a rentier economy is paradoxical, when it may also 
jeopardize the process of democratization.  On the other hand, if U.S. policy attempted to 
force democratic reform, King Abdullah may simply look to another state for financial 
assistance in order to avoid reform. 
What can this analysis determine about the future of Jordan and the bilateral 
relationship with the United States?  The sanctions on Iraq, the loss of Iraq as a major ally 
and trading partner, and pro-Iraqi sentiments within Jordan have a major impact on the 
economy and domestic stability.  Jordanian officials were quick to announce that the 
U.S.-Jordanian joint military exercise held in fall 2002 was not connected with the 
potential war in Iraq for fear of repercussion.  Currently, Jordan is undergoing another 
crisis due to the poor economy, opposition to the normalization campaign, and the 
potential war in Iraq.  As history has shown, the United States responded to crisis in 
Jordan once again with increased security assistance.  From the United State’s 
perspective, the additional aid assists Jordan with the war on terrorism and compels the 
monarchy to give tacit approval to the war on Iraq.  Although Jordan has increased their 
efforts in intelligence sharing and cracking down on the Islamists, ultimately the finances 
will equip the regime to uphold the rentier structure and protect itself.  Will this crisis be 
                                                 
40 Wiktorowicz, p. 608. 
41 Luciani uses Algeria and Egypt as case studies to make the argument that progress towards 
democratization does not guarantee success (pp. 144-152). 
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the force that demands further liberalization?  The answer is inconclusive, but as long as 
security assistance continues to bolster the regime, it does not bode well for a future 


































III. JORDANIAN ELITE PRIVILEGE AND THE MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If Jordan depends on foreign aid to retain its rentier structure and if these rents 
enable the democratic retreat by bolstering the regime, who is the main benefactor?  
Historically, the Jordanian Armed Forces are disproportionately composed of 
traditionally loyal East Bankers of Bedouin and Circassian origin.  However, with the 
weakening of tribal affiliations since the mid-1980's,42 support for the king must go 
beyond tribal identities.  This decline of support is evidenced by the participation of East 
Bankers in the 1989 riots.  It will be argued that finances have replaced tribal attachments 
as the primary factor for maintaining loyalty to the monarchy.  
The ethnic composition of the military is shrouded in the utmost confidentiality 
and there is little research focusing on this topic alone despite such claims that the army 
has a dominant Jordanian identity.  Thus, the focus of this chapter will survey the 
historical ethnic foundations of the Jordanian military.  Are Palestinians fully integrated 
into the Jordanian Armed Forces including leadership positions?  Has the influx of 
refugees since 1948 altered the demographics of the military?  What methods are used, if 
any, to maintain the Jordanian identity of the Armed Forces?  The following analysis 
relies on theory of soldiers in an ethnically divided state as well as methods of 
recruitment and other political devices used to shape military composition.  The answers 
to these questions serve to determine whether Jordanians benefit from U.S. security 
assistance disproportionately.  Furthermore, the analysis strives to discern whether 
security assistance maintains Jordanian elite political-military privilege in order to keep 




                                                 
42 Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study," http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jotoc.html 
(November, 2002). 
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 B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
There is a virtual consensus that Palestinians comprise the majority and up to two-
thirds, of the general population of Jordan.43  Official claims from Jordan maintain that 
Palestinians account for only 40 percent for the population.44  Despite disputes over 
whether Palestinians consist of 40 percent or 60 percent, this segment of society is 
significant and remains influential in both Jordanian domestic and foreign policy arenas.  
The reciprocal is true for the demography of the military establishment.  It has long been 
acknowledged that the Jordanian Armed Forces are dominated by the ‘loyal’ Jordanian 
members of the population.45  Thus, despite the overwhelming proportion of Palestinians 
in Jordanian society, they lack a significant presence in the Jordanian military. 
The Jordanian census taken in 1979 and 1994 failed to publish empirical data to 
account for the Palestinian-Jordanian percentage of the population.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the consensus of scholars and historians, little empirical data exists to 
support such claims.  Several problems confront those who attempt to determine the 
demographic breakdown of Jordan, such as the secrecy of the topic and defining who is a 
Jordanian or Palestinian.   
The Jordanian government disputes claims of Palestinian majority.  Primarily, this 
is to counter the Israeli Likud party’s historical slogan that “Jordan is Palestine,” or that 
“Palestinians already have a state.”  Furthermore, acknowledgement of a Palestinian 
majority is contradictory to the effort of producing a united Jordanian national identity.  
                                                 
43 Schirin H. Fathi, Jordan - An  Invented Nation?: Tribe-state dynamics and the formation of national 
identity (Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient—Institut, 1994) p. 121; and Laurie A. Brand, Palestinians 
in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988) p. 186; and Joseph A. Massad, Identifying the nation: The Juridical and Military Bases of Jordanian 
National Identity.  Diss. Columbia University, 1998 (Ann Arbor: UMI Microform, 1998) p.352; and Adnan 
Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process 
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In the end, most documentation of the Palestinian population in Jordan results from 
refugee statistics.   
Various events have affected the flow of refugees into Jordan, consequently 
changing the demography.  The influx of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war 
followed by the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the granting of citizenship to 
all Palestinians in Jordan, eventually raised the Palestinian population to two-thirds the 
majority.46  The loss of the West Bank due to the 1967 war and the consequential influx 
of additional refugees maintained the 60 percent figure.47  Formal separation of the West 
Bank in 1989 followed by the Gulf War in 1990-91 created additional refugees raising 
the Palestinian population to approximately 70 percent.48  However, the question arises 
whether these historical demographic fluctuations occurred in the Palestinian population 
in the military as well. 
C. PALESTINIANS, THE FIFTH COLUMN 
The military is considered the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy.  Under King 
Hussein the army was known as the “most constant and reliable source of support.”49  
Schirin Fathi maintains that the army continues to this day to be the “final arbiter of 
political power,” also noting that the Jordan remains the “quintessential monarchical/ 
tribal-military axis.”50  Thus, as the key pillar of the regime, the Jordanian military 
prevents challenges to the state both internal and external.  To require such loyalty to the 
Hashemite monarchy, the military plays a pivotal role in overcoming the increasing 
Palestinian population who are seen as a threat to the Jordanian identity of the state.  
Valerie Yorke, concurs that,  
Transjordanians play a key stabilizing role as the backbone of the Armed 
Forces and the security system.  The binding unity between the monarch 
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and the Transjordanian-dominated Army, police and intelligence remains 
the principal underpinning of the Hashemite Kingdom.51   
The most sensitive positions and most essential units to internal security require 
unquestionable loyalty to the King.  Thus, “elite units and commands remain largely 
tribal, and in crisis situations are entrusted to members of the Hashemite family, with the 
King himself maintaining close links to the elite units.”52  A Transjordanian identity itself 
was traditionally not enough to declare loyalty to the King.  During World War II, almost 
all the Arab Legion’s soldiers were recruited from the southern Jordanian tribes, regarded 
as the most devout to the monarchy.   
It would seem that with the unification of the West and East Banks in 1950, it 
would be necessary to incorporate Palestinians into the military in order to placate the 
Palestinian population.  Adnan Abu-Odeh writes, that Palestinians began to join the 
military in the 1950’s, but the combat units themselves remained mostly Transjordanian.  
Furthermore, after fifteen years only a few select loyal Palestinians joined the senior 
ranks of the Armed Forces.53  Why are Palestinians seen as disloyal?  How does the 
Hashemite monarchy keep the large Palestinian population from joining the military and 
overtaking the ranks? 
1. Ethnic Soldiers as a Liability 
Several works have been written on minority or ethnic soldiers and their 
integration into the military.54  Alon Peled asks the crucial question, “If recruited, trained, 
and armed, will ethnic soldiers become loyal soldiers or dangerous saboteurs?”55  If the 
Jordanian military has been and remains the bedrock of the Transjordanian identity and 
regime stability, it becomes axiomatic that Palestinians are considered a liability.  History 
reminds the Monarchy of attempted coup de etats, but the worst fear is an uprising similar 
to the Shi’a revolt against Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 Gulf War.  Would Palestinians 
                                                 
51 Valerie Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel (Brookfield, 
Vermont: Gower Publishing, 1988) p. 18. 
52 Fathi, p. 141. 
53 Abu-Odeh, p. 51. 
54 See Alon Peled, A Question of Loyalty (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) and Cythia H. 
Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). 
55 Peled, p. 2. 
 28
lead an armed revolt with the arms and military training granted by the very government 
they are supposed to protect?  Cynthia Enloe writes,  
Rifles and tanks may still be entrusted only to men from certain trusted 
ethnic groups, and their field officers remain subject to political-
communal security.  But jobs in the kitchens, behind the wheels of trucks, 
in hospital tents or at radar stations may be increasingly considered by 
security elites to be far enough removed from real power to be open to 
men—and women—with ethnic identities considered politically 
untrustworthy.56 
Therefore, the assignment of duties to ethnic Palestinian soldiers that do not threaten the 
mission, or more importantly the regime itself, can control the integration of Palestinians 
and minimize the threat to the regime.   
In the 1950’s, Palestinians joined the military but primarily served in technical 
career fields of Signal or Engineer units.57  Furthermore, Palestinians were almost 
exclusively assigned to the maintenance shops of the Arab Legion.58  Glubb Pasha noted 
that the Arab Legion was even more thorough than the British Army in conducting 
security checks on an annual basis to maintain loyalty.59  Palestinians were therefore 
heavily scrutinized to determine whether or not they had any political involvement.60  In 
1968, Palestinians started to join some infantry units; however their participation in these 
units did not exceed 15-20 percent.61  Following the civil war, the Palestinians as a whole 
increased as a liability, which in turn decreased their percentage in combat units.62  The 
same situation exists today where Palestinian officers are not allowed to command 
combat units at the battalion level or above.63  Palestinians by their nature are regarded as 
the merchant class of the population.  Therefore, Laurie Brand asserts that they are more 
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likely to have the technical and managerial skills needed by a modern army; however 
their inclusion is primarily in the lower-echelon.64 
The demography of the Jordanian military thus reveals an appearance that the 
Jordanians are typically loyal while Palestinians are not.  To the contrary, Laurie Brand 
points out that serious threats to the throne have not always come from Palestinians; the 
army and East Bank collaborators have also historically presented threats.65  The coup 
attempt in 1957, came from the military, however it was also loyal elements in the 
military that rescued King Hussein.  Since 1957, the intense focus on maintaining loyalty 
in the military has prevented a successful coup.   
It is perplexing that Palestinians would not demand further integration into the 
combat units and the senior ranks.  Abu-Odeh notes, that “the de-Palestinianization of the 
security apparatus has triggered a self-perpetuating divisiveness.  Transjordanians look 
on Palestinian-Jordanians as disloyal or, perhaps, as permanent suspects, and thus see no 
reason why they should be a part of officialdom.”66  After the attempt on King Hussein’s 
life on June 9, 1970, the military responded by shelling two Palestinian refugee camps in 
Amman.  Thus, the target of the refugee camps “implied that the army looked on all 
Palestinians as an extension of the fedayeen and vice versa.”67  The beginnings of the 
civil war were brewing and the direct threat of the fedayeen and the Palestinians as a 
whole to the monarchy, converged in Black September.  More confounding is that 
Palestinians in the army, for the most part, remained loyal during the civil war.  
Palestinians and Jordanians alike were on both sides of the conflict during the civil war;68 
nonetheless, their percentage in the Jordanian military dropped immediately following 
the crisis.69  Thus, the Palestinians are still regarded as a liability regardless of their 
allegiance during one of the country’s most challenging moments. 
 
                                                 
64 Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 155. 
65 Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 184. 
66 Abu-Odeh, p. 198. 
67 Abu-Odeh, p. 177. 
68 Fathi, p. 138. 
69 Fathi, p. 140. 
 30
2. Recruiting Reliable Personnel 
In order keep a consistent loyal base in the military; the Armed Forces must 
evaluate the reliability of a recruit versus their value.  The less allegiant will be made 
cannon fodder or cooks, or as noted above placed in non-combat, technical fields.  
During a crisis, the need for greater manpower will also increase the liability as more 
minorities are inserted into the army.  Furthermore, according to Enloe, several military 
transformations can take place during the course of a war with respect to ethnic 
cleavages.  First, the ethnic composition of a military will change, second, the ethnic 
differentiations between the ranks will change, and third, the ethnic differences between 
various branches and units will grow.70  Ethnic integration during a war also results in a 
“last in, first out”71 procedure that situates the troops of questionable reliability at the 
perilous front lines when manpower needs prescribe additional troops.  These unreliable 
troops will also immediately detach from the military at the end of a crisis.   
These ethnic variations are evident in the history of the Jordanian military.  
Palestinians began incorporation into the Jordanian military in the 1950’s in a separate 
National Guard unit.  The low-paid National Guard was assigned the duty of watching 
the front line and to defend their villages from Israeli retributive attacks.72  The National 
Guard gave the Palestinians a sense of participation, although this was not its purpose.  
King Hussein asserted that the purpose of the National Guard was to “defend the border 
in order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of (Israeli) 
aggression, to direct its strikes at specific targets.”73  However, with little training, few 
weapons, and hardly any coordination or transportation,74 the National Guard was 
essentially canon fodder for Israeli attacks.  Moreover, the regime feared armed, trained, 
mobile Palestinian troops would threaten regime stability.75  To counter this fear, Arab 
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Legion officers and NCOs commanded the National Guard,76 thereby intensifying the 
ethnic differences between ranks. 
Conscription itself can change the ethnic composition of a military; however a 
state can mitigate an ethnic transformation through the establishment of selective 
conscription versus universal conscription.  Therefore, if universal conscription risks the 
security of the state by introducing disloyal groups of society, the state can opt for 
selective conscription.77  Voluntary service is another method of securing self-motivated, 
more loyal men to receive training and arms rather than forcing a potential liability to 
have a gun.78  In order to take advantage of manpower needs while preserving loyalty, 
the Jordanian military was able to control the ethnic balance in the military through 
various stages of conscription. 
In the 1950’s, the demand for Palestinian participation in the military resulted in 
selective conscription and King Hussein’s policy to scrutinize potential Palestinian 
recruits.79  However, Cynthia Enloe argues that the purpose of conscription is solely 
manpower and not to promote participation or inclusion of ethnic soldiers.80  Although 
the conscription of Palestinians was contrary to Enloe’s rule of inclusion and 
participation, the duties they were given were negligible.  Furthermore, the demography 
of Jordan is unique by the fact that the discriminated ethnic group is the majority.  This 
vulnerability of security and identity makes the inclusion of Palestinians more sensitive 
when domestic political instability arises.  In 1965, the National Guard was disbanded, 
conscription was halted, and Palestinians were infused into the Arab legion forming 
about 40 percent of the military.81  In 1966, conscription was again initiated in response 
to protests in the Palestinian West Bank.  The perceived ineptitude of the Jordanian 
government to protect the village population of al-Samu from an Israeli attack forced 
                                                 
76 Hurewitz, p. 316. 
77 Enloe, p.51. 
78 Enloe, pp. 54-55. 
79 Cited in Massad, p. 310. 
80 Enloe, p. 83. 
81 Fathi, p. 140 and the Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study." 
 32
King Hussein to integrate the Palestinians into the army once again.82  Even though 
conscription was a state policy at this time, it was never really applied in full;83 therefore 
it was still more selective than universal in nature.  In 1970, the conscription policy was 
banned altogether for fear of admitting fedayeen and non-loyal Palestinians lowering the 
Palestinian component of the military to approximately 15 percent.84  Thereafter, the 
military was replaced by a voluntary Popular Army consisting of mostly Jordanian 
officers and Jordanian volunteers to maintain the utmost loyalty.85  Joseph Massad cites 
an example in 1972 in which the Cadet School had only 20 Palestinians out of 273 
candidates.86  Furthermore, those Palestinians that remained in the army were retired 
early.87  Up until 1976, conscription in the Jordanian military can be characterized as 
selective in nature based on loyalty. 
Compulsory service was reinstated in 1976, which in turn boosted the Palestinian 
composition of the military once again.88  However, this universal conscription did not 
result in a thorough integration of Palestinians since the overall identity of the army 
remained Jordanian, especially the officer corps.89  Conscription remained on the books 
until 1992, where it was discontinued in pursuit of a more “professional army.”  The 
Jordanian Prime Minister Sharif Zeid bin Shaker said that lessons learned from the Gulf 
War demonstrate that professional soldiers perform better than conscripts, thus Jordan 
needed a more cost-effective, modern army.90  There are several ways to interpret what 
bin Shaker meant by this statement, but there is no doubt that the revolting Shi’a 
conscripts in Iraq served a lesson that ethnic soldiers were a liability as a fifth column.  
Furthermore, several months before conscription was terminated, Jordan began peace 
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negotiations with Israel.  Thus, at a moment when potential political instability demanded 
more loyalty in the military, halting conscription of Palestinians was paramount to 
maintain the allegiance of the key pillar to regime stability. 
Today since conscription does not exist at all in Jordan, the Jordanian military is 
able to selectively recruit those who will join the ranks.  For enlisted recruits, these 
campaigns are conducted twice a year in predominantly non-Palestinian areas.91  On the 
officer side, Mut’ah University, the equivalent of West Point, recruits primarily non-
Palestinians as well.  Although some Palestinians do enter the Armed Forces, the 
selective recruitment prohibits more from signing up.   
3. The Professional Military 
The stated objective of discontinuing conscription in 1992 was to increase the 
professionalism of the military, but is the Jordanian Armed Forces truly a professional 
military?  A true professional military, as defined by Cynthia Enloe, will allow the 
advancement of ethnic soldiers, give them a chance to command combat units and 
become equal members of the military.92  Professional militaries also will allow officers 
to make manpower decisions; therefore promotion will be based on performance rather 
than loyalty.  Conversely, ethnic soldiers in politicized militaries have difficulty with 
promotion and command, and typically serve in service-oriented and poorly equipped 
units.  Politicized militaries have politicians formulating manpower decisions based on 
political considerations, dooming ethnic soldiers to segregation and exclusion from the 
armed forces.93  Thus, the 1992 abolition of conscription in the Jordanian military 
provides little to generate a true professional military.  On the contrary, Jordan’s Armed 
Forces have everything in common with a politicized military.  Palestinians have had 
little success making the senior ranks and cannot rise in combat units above the rank of 
Major or Lieutenant Colonel, whereas in non-combat units they can make General.94  
Furthermore, the Palestinian presence in military units is historically not representative of 
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their majority status in the general population of Jordan.  Finally, loyalty rather than 
performance has traditionally been the key factor in promotion.  The King has 
traditionally used promotion to reward and perpetuate loyalty.95  The politicized 
character of the Jordanian military is also bolstered by the fact that many senior officers 
have close personal ties with the King.96 
Complementary to the policy of loyalty-based promotions is the dismissal of 
undesirable individuals or groups of individuals from the military.  Even if Jordan truly 
desired a professional military, external political intervention such as purging erodes any 
progress towards professionalism.97  Jordan’s history of implementing purges to dilute 
the influence of Palestinians in the military98 further reflects the politicized nature of the 
military.  Following the coup attempt in 1957, the Chief of Staff initiated a purge of 
dissident soldiers; some officers were decommissioned and some were tried by military 
courts.99  In 1967, following the defeat from Israel, King Hussein dismissed about forty 
officers and assumed personal command of the army himself to prevent internal threats 
from destabilizing the regime.100  In 1970, following the civil war, the monarchy 
conducted massive purges of both Palestinians and Jordanians in the military who were 
perceived as colluding with the fedayeen.101  More recently in 1999, when King 
Abdullah came to the throne, almost 100 senior officers were purged.102  This purge was 
initiated days after reports that leaflets were circulating the kingdom expressing support 
for the King’s brother, Crown Prince Hassan.103  Furthermore, it was assessed that many 
of the officers were dismissed due to their relationship with the Crown Prince,104 and that 
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he guaranteed promotions to various officers in an attempt to establish loyalty while King 
Hussein was away in the United States receiving cancer treatment.105  King Hussein 
himself accused his brother of meddling with the senior echelons of the armed forces and 
declared his son Abdullah as Crown Prince over Hassan.106  The 1999 purges, while 
political in nature, also demonstrate that both Palestinians and Jordanians have a history 
of threatening the crown.  Also of note, it has become tradition in Jordan that top military 
officers are promoted immediately before they retired.107  Therefore, due to the political 
nature of promotions and purges, the last ditch promotion is most likely an effort to 
preempt the organization of subversive acts even after these officers leave the military.  
Moreover, the large scope of the 1999 purge exhibits the seriousness of the internal 
threat, the pivotal role of the military in both attempting and quelling a coup and finally, 
the questionable reliability of one’s own brother. 
The final key trait of a professional military is its reluctance to accept an internal 
defense mission, and will do so only to defend the state from external threats.108  On the 
contrary, Jordan’s military has redirected its focus towards the internal threat versus an 
external threat since making peace with Israel in 1994.  Based on recommendations from 
the U.S. Department of Defense in 1994, Jordan restructured the military to provide a 
lighter more mobile force focused primarily on border security and internal security.109  
Subsequently, as described in Chapter 2, the military becomes a defender of primarily the 
regime rather than the entire state.  Therefore, the Jordanian military has traditionally 
used various tools to maintain loyalty but they have been counterproductive to producing 
a true professional military if that is indeed the end goal. 
4. Finances 
The final and possibly most important factor that enables the Jordanians to remain 
in control of the military is the continuous flow of money.  Finances are imperative to 
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fulfill a patron-client network in which money flows from the state to the military to the 
military elite who are rewarded for their loyalty to the monarchy.  Risa Brooks 
distinguishes military perquisites in two forms: “corporate benefits”, which include the 
military budgets, weapons, supplies, and other symbolic awards; and “private benefits”, 
which include high salaries, housing benefits, education benefits, and high-quality health 
care. 110  Conversely, the lack of funds to provide corporate and private benefits to the 
military can erode loyalty and create political instability.  Yorke writes, “failure on the 
part of the King to acquire access to the weapons necessary for the Army to fulfill this 
defensive role, or a consistent disregard for defense as opposed to development needs, 
could cause professional morale problems and erode loyalty for the King.”111     
Since the United States reestablished security assistance to Jordan following the 
Gulf War, the Jordanian military benefited from just under $1 billion dollars from the 
United States.112  This accounted for approximately 43% of the total security assistance 
package, which essentially fell into the hands of the ethnic Jordanian military elites.   
As shown in Chapter 2, Jordan's military budget has been increasing modestly to 
fund corporate benefits.  Acquisition of improved military technology and advanced 
weapons can act as a force multiplier, thereby enabling a smaller military force.  This is 
likely appealing to the monarchy, since it suspended conscription as evidenced in 1992 
and it prefers increased selectiveness among its soldiers. 
In addition to modern training and weapons, targeted financial benefits toward  
military quality of life promotes steadfastness as well.  For example, in 1980, the King 
granted reserved seats at Jordan’s universities and full scholarships to the children of 
military officers and servicemen whose fathers served for at least ten years in the Armed 
Forces.113  Additionally, the military lives in exclusive villas built for them by the 
government, they have the best health care system in the country, and they are highly 
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paid relative to the rest of the population.114  Approximately 85% of Jordan’s military 
budget is earmarked directly for salaries, care and training of soldiers.115   
Cynthia Enloe argues that security assistance has ethnic consequences by infusing 
money, training, and weapons into the military, turning a weak military into a strong one 
and making the military worth controlling.116  Secondly, externally derived military 
resources can alter the domestic influence and internal order-keeping capabilities of the 
armed forces.117  For better or for worse, military aid has improved Jordan’s ability to 
maintain internal security thus abetting Jordanian control over the means of violence.  
Therefore, security assistance appears to encourage the persistence rather than the decline 
of ethnic calculations among military state elites.118  Hurewitz proclaims that financial 
assistance to Jordan in the 1950’s “kept a nonviable state alive”.119  Is this true today 
with U.S. security assistance?  Military aid provides improved weapons and training thus 
raising the stakes of recruiting more Palestinians.  The monarchy fears if more 
Palestinians were to enter the military, especially in key leadership or combat positions, 
they would be better equipped to stage a successful coup with these modern weapons. 
Some may argue that relative to the billions of dollars in military aid that Israel 
receives, the amount granted to Jordan is insignificant to pacify the military.  On the 
contrary, in Jordan where resources are scarce and the industrial base is weak, 
employment in the military is a private benefit, a matter of prestige, and a form of 
cooptation for Jordanians. 
Together these corporate and private benefits serve concurrently to “buy” 
patronage from the military and maintain loyalty.  In short, an increasing military budget 
can facilitate the effort to buy Jordanian loyalty and exclude Palestinians.  Keeping these 
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weapons out of the hands of Palestinians, thus upholds Jordanian hegemony and regime 
stability. 
D. THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES TODAY 
The Jordanian military to this day is still proclaimed as a Jordanian dominated 
force despite the Palestinian majority in the general population.  In the mid-1980’s, it was 
estimated that the Palestinians in the Jordanian military was under 25 percent,120 however 
this estimate is hardly recent.  Adnan Abu-Odeh writes,  
The exact percentage of Palestinians in the army, public security, and 
Mukhabarat is unknown, but few observers would describe it as other than 
insignificant.  One can easily feel that the state is specifically 
Transjordanian rather than just Jordanian.121   
Joseph Massad asserts that numbers or percentage of Palestinians in the military is not as 
important as who receives the key assignments at the senior levels.122  Even then, it is 
still accepted that Palestinians are excluded from the sensitive senior ranks today,123 
however, the empirical data to support these claims are lacking.  Is it possible that after 
fifty years of a Palestinian majority that they would become more integrated into the 
military and recognized as first class citizens?  The fact that Queen Rania herself is a 
Palestinian could lead one to believe that Palestinians are now able to break the barrier.  
Furthermore, with the increase in intermarriages between Jordanians and Palestinians, 
such as the King and Queen, it has clouded personal and national identities even further.  
Therefore, if a true communal identity exists, it would seem any Palestinian-Jordanian 
loyal to the state would be able to serve in the military without any discriminatory 
consequences. 
In an attempt to identify the current ethnic foundations of the Jordanian military 
leadership, the following analysis involves a pool of 115 current and retired Jordanian 
officers.124  The majority of the officers held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above.  
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The method of choice to determine whether one is of Palestinian or Jordanian descent is 
through the surname.  This method does not take into account one’s nationalistic loyalty 
nor one’s personal identity, however, it is difficult to unravel the national ‘origins’ of the 
offspring except through paternalist notions of nationality.125  Therefore, the following 
data bases nationality on the surname of these officers.  Of 115 officer names, 51 percent 
were easily identifiable of Transjordanian origin.  While 49 percent were unidentifiable, 
they could easily be Transjordanian who use their Grandfather’s names as last names 
making the distinction more difficult.126   
Since key assignments are of more interest than overall numbers, it is important to 
note that Transjordanians held six of the eight most senior military positions.  The 
remaining two were unidentifiable by name alone, however it is also of interest that one 
of these two was suddenly retired in the beginning of March 2002127 and the other was in 
Washington D.C. as a Defense Attaché.  Also of significance is that King Abdullah used 
his familial ties to promote his brother, Prince Faisal to Chief of Staff of the Jordanian 
Air Force in March 2002.128  The March 2002 officer shuffle consisted of ten senior 
officer dismissals including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.129  Simultaneously, 
the growing Palestinian demonstrations in Jordan and the United States’ call for regime 
change in Iraq demonstrate that this purge resulted from political instability.   
Thirty of the surnames were predecessors to the senior most positions.  Of these, 
twenty-one were Transjordanian and eight were unidentifiable.  Furthermore, there were 
only two Palestinian officers identified in the entire list of 115.  One of the two 
Palestinian names was that of the former Defense Attaché assigned to Washington D.C.  
This particular Palestinian officer rose to the senior ranks of Brigadier General, however, 
he was certainly geographically removed from the regime to do any harm.  Furthermore, 
as an Attaché he did not command a combat unit and therefore did not have access to 
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arms to create any trouble.  Therefore, according to this analysis, the claims of Jordanian 
control of the military appear to be valid today.  The extent to which the military exploits 
available tools to subjugate the Palestinians prevents the military from providing a means 
of social mobility as it does in many societies. 
Despite the evidence that Jordanians hold the key positions, does this mean it is a 
state policy to exclude Palestinians from the senior ranks.  Adnan Abu-Odeh discusses 
the discrimination present in Jordan and boldly declares, “the Transjordanian domination 
of the army was a policy...”130 Furthermore, he argues that purges conducted by 
Transjordanians of Palestinian-Jordanians following the 1970 civil war was “tantamount 
to an official declaration that Transjordanians were the favored, trusted community.”131  
However, if it was a policy is it still policy today?  Laurie Brand asserts that preferential 
recruitment into the army is in fact policy however, unwritten.132   
Some dispute the Palestinian discrimination and state that it is merely a choice of 
Palestinians to refrain from the Armed Forces and not policy.  Schirin Fathi interviewed 
Palestinians who insisted that Palestinians as a group prefer to take advantage of other 
options open to them, in the private sector for example.133  This belief may hold since it 
is also accepted that Palestinians dominate the business sector of Jordan, however, the 
history of policies to maintain loyalty in the military has resulted in Palestinian exclusion 
to the present day and the means which the monarchy uses to consolidate power is 
unquestionably politically inspired. 
E. THREAT OR PAWN? 
Despite perceived discrimination against the Palestinians in the military, some 
argue that Palestinians not a threat at all.  Alon Peled asserts, “Given a chance to serve 
their countries, ethnic soldiers are almost always loyal soldiers.”  In his case studies of 
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South Africa, Israel, and Singapore, he finds few incidents of disloyalty.134  Adnan Abu-
Odeh concurs that, 
Charges of Palestinian-Jordanian disloyalty to the state of Jordan have 
become ludicrous…equally ludicrous are arguments that Palestinian-
Jordanians pose a threat to Jordanian identity—a threat that seems not to 
have existed before 1967, despite Palestinian-Jordanian accounting for 
two-thirds of the population.135   
Furthermore, as explained above, even in 1970, Palestinian-Jordanians remained just as 
loyal as Jordanians.  Brand concurs, “Palestinian members of the army did not mutiny, 
and large sectors of the Palestinian community remained aloof from the fighting.”136  
Moreover, Hillel Frisch interprets a survey conducted by the University of Jordan’s 
Center for Strategic Studies in the winter of 1995 and remarks, “it is significant that the 
vast majority of Palestinians regarded themselves as being loyal to the state.”137  Yet 
even though Palestinians regard themselves as loyal, those who effectively control the 
manpower of the military fear losing their monopoly of violence to the Palestinians.  
However, Joseph Massad asserts that historically all internal military threats to the 
regime came from Transjordanian elements in the military.138  Similarly, the 1989 
popular uprisings took place in southern almost exclusively Transjordanian cities with no 
Palestinian Jordanian participation whatsoever.139  The recent March 2002 purge in the 
senior ranks of the military also demonstrates a potential Transjordanian military threat to 
the regime.  Are Palestinians truly a threat or might they be discriminated against simply 
to preserve the Jordanian domination of the military and give cause to the regime’s focus 
on internal security? 
Such a policy effectually increases divisiveness between Palestinians and 
Jordanians.  Historically, periods of terminating conscription or inadequate Palestinian 
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representation in the military has resulted in Palestinian inclusion to appease the potential 
for political instability.  However, for the past ten years there has been no effort to further 
integrate Palestinians into the Armed Forces.  Adnan Abu-Odeh writes, 
Transjordanian control of the security apparatus has had a more adverse 
impact on national unity that Transjordanian dominance of civil 
administration.  The state—any state—holds the monopoly on violence.  
But when the security apparatus is controlled by one group in a society 
where tribal kinship supercedes the rule of law, then neutrality of 
repression, an essential factor for intercommunal harmony, disappears.140 
Jordanian-Palestinians have become second-class citizens in a state where they 
consensually hold the majority of the population.  Despite the granting of official 
Jordanian citizenship in 1950, Palestinians are not equal to Transjordanians.  If military 
service is recognized as a precondition for full and equal citizenship, then those barred 
from the military are neither citizens nor soldiers.141  The 1995 survey conducted by the 
University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies revealed that 74.1% of the Palestinian 
elite felt that restriction to sensitive posts represents an obstacle to national unity, the 
highest response rate to any of the differences or obstacles posed in the survey.142  
Regardless of whether the Palestinians consist of 50 or 70 percent of the total population, 
the regime has always maintained a defensive stance domestically.143  It appears that the 
threat of Palestinian-Jordanians may be more paranoia than a true threat.  Regardless, the 
discrimination of Palestinians from military service threatens discord among the society 
as a whole.   
F. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter acknowledges that Palestinians are not fully integrated 
in the Jordanian military and that ethnic Jordanians remain in control the military.  
Currently, it is virtually impossible to determine the true demography of the military due 
to the utmost confidentiality.  However, the empirical data from the sample of surnames 
demonstrates that Jordanians do in fact hold the majority if not all the key positions in the 
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military.  Principally, it is U.S. security assistance that sustains the elite political-military 
privilege of Jordanians.   
The political methods used to instill and perpetuate loyalty consequently affect 
the demography of the military.  Palestinian exclusion from combat units and command, 
the history of selective conscription, and the current policy of selective recruitment serve 
to maintain Jordanian loyalty and control of the military for the sake of regime security.  
The nature of this politicized military places so much focus on loyalty that job 
performance is secondary and purges become commonplace.  Furthermore, financial 
resources provide the mainstay for Jordanian supremacy, increases the risk of Palestinian 
subversion, and also enables the military to focus on internal, rather than external 
security.  Whether Palestinians are truly a fifth column is almost inconsequential since 
historically their subjugation will result regardless.  Any future demographical 
transformation or professionalization of the Jordanian military would have to take place 
at the expense of the Jordanian military elite.   
While tribal and ethnic identities are important for the military to remain loyal, 
the finances supplied to the military are a solidifying factor.  Without their current 









IV. THE MILITARY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN JORDAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The variety of published works on democratization in Jordan all describe the 
process with negative connotations such as “defensive”144, “facade”145, 
“monarchical146”, “top-down”, “tactical”147, “frozen”148, and “decorative and 
superficial.”149  In short, present research demonstrates that the democratization process 
appears not to attain the goal of democracy but rather a strategy of regime survivability.  
Most of these publications emphasize domestic constraints such as political economy, 
civil society, or political culture.  The intent of the following analysis is to examine the 
external factor of military assistance and determine whether it plays a role in the process 
of democratization.  More specifically, does U.S. security assistance to a Jordanian-
dominated military impact the process of democratization?   
The objective is to determine whether security assistance: 1) maintains the status 
quo of a politicized Jordanian military and presents civil-military challenges that inhibit 
further democratization, 2) supplies cooptation of ethnic Jordanian military elites to 
enable democratization, or 3) has no factor in the democratization process.  The 
organization of this research endeavors to explain the military’s role in transition from 
authoritarian rule, pacts as they apply to the Jordanian military, and more specifically, the 
cooptation of the Jordanian military elite.  Furthermore, it will present challenges to 
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Jordanian civil-military relations that must be overcome for a successful path to 
democracy.  The hypothesis is that security assistance provides an incomplete military 
pact that presents more problems than solutions to a democratic transition.  The focus on 
regime stability and regional peace promotes the status quo of a politicized Jordanian 
military with an internal security role and sacrifices further democratization.   
Ali Kassay concludes that King Hussein took the path of democratization to 
acquire financial assistance after witnessing the example in Eastern Europe.150  He 
writes,  
Since emergent democracies were strong candidates for Western 
assistance by becoming a regional leader in democratization.  In this 
sense, democratization may not have been an attempt to reform the rentier 
economy, as the classic outlook suggests, but an attempt to gain the means 
to preserve it.151 
If this is true, then security assistance may simply be a means to maintain the status quo 
and not to implement true democratic reform in Jordan.  It is not the objective to argue 
that military aid is holistically responsible for the lack of democratization but rather to 
ask the question whether military aid has a positive relationship facilitating 
democratization or a negative relationship that enables the retreat of this process 
specifically in Jordan. 
U.S. policy seeks to provide regional and internal Jordanian stability and security 
through its program of security assistance.  Admittedly, democracy is not a stated goal in 
U.S. foreign policy with Jordan, although as mentioned in Chapter 1, throughout the 
1990’s democracy was increasingly promoted as a foreign policy objective of the United 
States; therefore any promotion of democracy in Jordan remains indirect.  It is still 
significant to determine whether or not a positive or negative relationship exists between 
military aid and democratization. 
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One scholar insists that a negative relationship exists between military aid and 
democratization arguing that arms transfers can facilitate coups.152  More specifically, 
Shannon Lindsey Blanton argues that increased arms transfers inhibit “human security” 
and consequently hinders democratization.153  Both of these statistical analyses present a 
bleak outlook for the future of arms transfers in relation to democratization in Jordan.   
Talukder Maniruzzaman writes, “by strengthening the armed forces, arms transfer 
facilitates and accelerates the process of military takeover of the powers of the state.”154  
In his analysis of 80 developing countries, Jordan ranked high at number six in terms of 
per capita arms transfers relative to population and GNP.155  Maniruzzaman readily 
admits that he cannot explain why Jordan ranks so high for a potential coup and yet a 
coup attempt has not occurred since 1957.  The short answer is that Jordan, along with 
other Middle Eastern states, has become cunningly adept at preventing coups.  The 
detailed answer will become evident as the analysis continues. 
Blanton flatly states, “The negative relationship between democracy and arms 
imports indicates that developing countries that import greater amounts of arms are less 
likely to be democracies…As a consequence, the development of democratic governance 
is inhibited.”156  Blanton bases her assertion on a dataset of 91 developing countries for a 
15 year period from 1981-1995 using liberal democracy, personal integrity rights, and 
human development as three separate dependent variables.157  She concludes,  
Increased arms imports are linked to weaker levels of democracy and 
harsher personal integrity rights conditions.  Thus a paradox exists: though 
arms transfers are commonly conceived as a primary tool for increasing 
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‘security’ against threats, in reality they contribute to insecurity in the 
developing world.158   
Despite Jordanian liberalization since 1989, one cannot deny the lack of meaningful 
democracy however, simply attributing security assistance as the failure risks 
exaggerated oversimplification.  Therefore, it is important to assess if or why this 
negative relationship may exist in Jordan. 
On the other hand, scholars of democracy profess that military pacts are essential 
to keep the military from intervening in democratic reform.  O’Donnell and Schmitter 
define pacts as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement 
among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing 
the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those 
entering into it.”159  In short, a pact is a temporary solution to avoid negative 
outcomes.160  Pertaining specifically to the military, a pact can provide guarantees to the 
military while also committing the military to the process of liberalization and the 
institutions of democracy.  Thus, the military will refrain from intervening in politics and 
attempting a coup and finally will submit to civilian control in order for democracy to be 
successful. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE TRANSITION  
In order to identify a positive or negative relationship between security assistance 
and democratization in Jordan it is important to study the role of the military in the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  Since the military holds the monopoly of 
violence it has the means to abruptly end the democratization process through force.  
Thus, the role of the military in this process can be the most difficult to overcome.  
Primarily, it is critical to prevent military intervention in the democratization process.  
The goal is to neutralize the military and keep the military in the barracks to prevent a 
coup.  Many developing countries have experienced military interference in the transition 
to democracy and a return to an authoritarian or military regime.  The military fears not 
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only losing their benefits and prestige but they also fear blame and persecution for 
domestic crimes committed during the authoritarian rule.   
Since the process of liberalization has winners and losers it is also imperative to 
compensate the losers in order to receive a commitment to democracy.  In the case of the 
Jordanian military, they are anticipated losers in the democratization process.  Following 
the example of other democratizing states, it will be necessary for the military to accept 
civilian control and oversight.  Typically democracy involves a reduction of a bloated 
military budget common to authoritarian regimes, oversight of the budget, possible 
reduction of perquisites and an overall professionalization of the military.  These alone 
are reason for the military to resist democratization.  Additionally, the winners are certain 
to be the opposition to the monarchy.  In the case of Jordan, the Palestinians and the 
Islamists are likely to gain more access to the military and parliament through 
democracy.  This would risk Palestinian infiltration into the ranks of the Jordanian 
dominated military which threatens a transformation of the very institution linked with 
the Jordanian identity and a reduction of their prestigious status.  Larry Diamond adds,  
The challenge for democratic consolidation, then, is to gradually roll back 
these prerogatives and refocus the military’s mission, training, and 
expenditures around issues of external security.  By definition, democracy 
cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to 
civilian control and committed to the democratic constitutional order.161 
Therefore, secondary to the guarantee that the military will not intervene and commit a 
coup is a guarantee or a pact to commit the military to professionalization or civilian 
control. 
C. THE MILITARY PACT 
As mentioned above, a negotiated transition or a pact can potentially keep the 
military from intervening in the democratization process.  Without a pact, if the military 
feels threatened, “they may simply sweep their opponents off the board or kick it over 
and start playing solitaire.”162  Although pacts are not necessary for the transition to 
democracy, O’Donnell and Schmitter are convinced that they enhance the probability that 
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the transition process will lead to a viable democracy,163 while others proclaim that pacts 
among elites are the “most successful formula for democratic transition.”164   
In the case of Jordan, it appears that security assistance could provide an 
economic incentive to the military to commit to democracy, however it also presents 
some problems.  First, O’Donnell and Schmitter readily admit that pacts are 
undemocratic as a means to secure loyalty to democracy.165  Second, pacts may be aided 
or voided by the forces of civil society.166  Considering the weak civil society in Jordan 
and the means of controlling it through the security services and police167, the odds of 
civil society aiding a military pact is discouraging.   
Finally, Peter Feaver insists that economic incentives are essentially bribes that 
when broken can trigger a coup.  Furthermore, they are inherently corrupting and they 
buy allegiance to the bribe not the institution.168  It is more probable that the military pact 
in Jordan is a bribe to retain allegiance to the regime, to refrain from intervening in 
politics and in return a guarantee of continuous benefits.  The pact made with the 
Islamists was formal and recognized in the National Charter, however this document does 
not address civil-military relations with any specificity.  The only mention of 
professionalism in the National Charter reads,  
Jordanian national security is also dependent on inculcating the concept of 
professionalism in the armed forces, broadening their base, developing 
their capabilities and rallying the resources of the country and people to 
their support, to enable them to perform their duty of protecting the 
country and contributing to its growth and development.169   
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Felipe Aguero observes, “A military will not be able to sustain the postauthoritarian 
regime the power and influence with which it enters the transition if this power is not 
backed with formal-legal arrangements.”170  Therefore, if professionalization of the 
military and civilian or parliamentary control over the military were goals it seems that it 
would be acknowledged in the National Charter in more than a vague manner.  
Considering the defensive nature of the democratization and the fact that the regime 
maintains it power through the military, it is not surprising that these issues are swept 
under the rug. 
C. CO-OPTING THE JORDANIAN MILITARY ELITES 
The Jordanian military’s stance on democracy is not public knowledge, however 
Diamond asserts, “Military officers in particular need to be convinced that expanding 
civilian control will not compromise the nation’s security or the institutional prestige and 
integrity of the military.”171  Thus far, U.S. security assistance provides the resources to 
implement a pact to ensure loyalty to the regime, however not necessarily for 
subordination to civilian leadership.  In addition to this pact, the Jordanian policy of 
recruiting primarily ethnic Jordanians, the purging of disloyal soldiers, frequent officer 
rotations, and promotions based on loyalty also explains the lack of coup attempts in 
Jordan.  Once the regime is secure with exogenous rents and a loyal military there is no 
need for further democratization as a regime survivability strategy.   
The retreat of democracy since making peace with Israel in 1994 brought a 
mission shift towards internal security as opposed to external security.  Additionally, the 
military decreased in size by approximately 30,000 personnel, most of which were 
reserve troops.172  This downsizing of the military further hindered its ability to fend off 
an external attack.  In return, the Jordanian military benefited financially from the “peace 
dividend”, and its decrease in size increased the per capita benefits in the military.  The 
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cancellation of conscription and the reduction of force maintained Jordanian control 
while creating the façade of moving towards military professionalism.  More importantly, 
this concentrated the loyalty in the military to protect the regime while opposition to 
normalization with Israel was mounting.   
King Abdullah’s background as Commander of the Special Forces provides him a 
special rapport and legitimacy with the military.  The officer shuffle that took place 
following his ascent to the throne most likely resulted in the promotion of his 
acquaintances in the Special Forces community to senior positions.  Would King 
Abdullah strip prerogatives from his bastion of support and shift the military away from 
an internal security role that may threaten the endurance of his regime?  Such a move 
would likely result in a swift coup terminating Abdullah’s rule. 
D. CHALLENGES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
There are various challenges to Jordanian civil-military relations due to the 
mission of the military, the structure, the lack of civilian oversight, and the potentially 
insurmountable task of changing the mindset of the Jordanian military.  Jordan has not 
taken any major steps towards professionalization since abandoning conscription in 1992.   
First, the inward-looking, domestic security role and politicized mission of the 
Jordanian military presents challenges to the military’s relationship towards society.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter insists that even more important than buying off the military is 
transforming its doctrine or operational capability and shifting from an internal security 
role to an external security role.173  Furthermore, Michael Desch argues that internal 
security missions can develop the worst pattern of civil-military relations and gears the 
military towards intervention in domestic politics.174  It is perplexing that five years into 
the process of democratization and following the peace treaty with Israel that Jordan 
placed an greater emphasis on internal security.  One would expect that if the regime 
truly desired democracy that a pact with the military would include a reduced focus on 
internal security.  
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Civilian government officials must resist the temptation to turn to the military 
during political conflict or unruly domestic protests,175 however the monarchy has a 
history of utilizing the military for intervention in domestic security issues.  The 
Jordanian military was called in after the police failed to suppress riots at Karak in 1996 
and played a prominent role in restoring order in Ma’an in 1998.176  The Mukhabarat, or 
Public Security Directorate, as well plays a prominent role in checking potential domestic 
security issues.  Although the role of the Mukhabarat has diminished with the 
democratization process,177 it still succeeds in suppressing civil society and the formation 
of political opposition.178 
Second, the structure of the military is focused around internal security as well, 
and due to a degree of paranoia the forces are diversified to prevent any one from being 
overly powerful.  As in many Arab countries, “multiple military branches and 
intelligence services are maintained to cancel each other out in terms of power and 
influence.”179  Jordan’s Arab Army, the Royal Jordanian Special Forces, the Royal 
Guard, and the Public Security Directorate all have a role in maintaining domestic 
security.  Furthermore, the General Intelligence Directorate is a component of the 
military but it provides domestic as well as foreign intelligence.  Risa Brooks writes, 
“Developing specific combat and intelligence units designated for internal security is 
another essential safeguard against military intervention in politics.”180  Therefore, all of 
these organizations serve to protect the regime from opposition as well as preventing one 
of the military organizations from committing a coup. 
Third, there is a general lack of civilian oversight of the Jordanian military.  The 
military is only accountable to the King; this is true for the military mission, the budget, 
and procurement.  In Arab regimes, “the lack of legislative oversight encourages 
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bureaucratic parochialism and means that there is little transparency in decisions 
affecting military procurement.”181  Military acquisitions are often based on prestige and 
not need and thus they do not always provide a military with an expanded capability.  
Therefore, security assistance does not necessarily provide a strong military considering 
Jordan remains weak relative to regional forces.  Subordinating the military mission, 
budget and procurement process to the parliament appears to be a “red line” that 
oppositionists are not allowed to cross.182  Even debating such topics in the parliament 
are likely to be prohibited.183 
Fourth, the mindset of the Jordanian military is not that of a professional military.  
The goal of International Military Education and Training (IMET) is to overcome the 
political involvement of foreign militaries and instill professional qualities “respectful of 
human rights and civil authority.”184  Samuel Huntington argues that exposure to U.S. 
military training and schools can increase acceptance of democratic norms and civilian 
control.185  However, can IMET itself overcome the inadequacies of Jordanian civil-
military relations?  Norville de Atkine blames Arab military culture for the failure to 
apply lessons taken from the American military.  He writes, “American military advisors 
find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply 
them.  The culture they return to—the culture of their own armies in their own 
countries—defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American 
instructors.”186  More specifically, those personnel who receive American military 
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training seldom share their knowledge with other soldiers.  De Atkine continues, “An 
Arab technician knows that he is invaluable as long as he is the only one in a unit to have 
that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge 
and his power dissipates.”187  Further confounding and costly to professionalism is that 
that American military training may even impede promotion to prevent the growth of 
American influence.188  Therefore, the task to attain military professionalism through 
IMET appears to be a disappointment. 
Since regime security is more important than the transition to democracy and 
meaningful military professionalism the prospects for civilian control of the military and 
consolidation of democracy are daunting.  Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner write, 
“Democratization of civil-military relations therefore needs to rely on processes of 
bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and consensus-building that gradually diminish 
military prerogatives and redefine and professionalize the military’s mission through a 
series of incremental steps.”189  Admittedly, democratization is a gradual process and 
civil-military relations will not develop overnight, however the military pact in place 
does not seem to guarantee anything outside the protection of the monarchy.  The 
professionalization of a military can be a double-edged sword and can undermine the 
regime seeking to implement it.190  If the monarchy has no intention of greater 
democracy then the military should not feel any threat from losing its benefits.  The 
regime is as dependent on the military as the military is on the regime.   
Maniruzzaman asks why economic and military aid had one result in Western 
Europe and Japan and the opposite in the Third World.  He responds that a country must 
reach a “threshold of modernization” before military aid can facilitate the military 
withdrawal from politics.  Finally, he concludes that military withdrawal from politics is 
caused by intrastate dynamics rather than interstate factors such as aid.191  Jordan appears 
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191 Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, 
not to have reached that threshold, however its strategic importance in regional peace 
prevails over democratization and military professionalism in rationalizing military aid 
from the U.S. 
Should the U.S. be more proactive in supporting democratization in Jordan?  
Kassay writes,  
Conservatives (in Jordan) realize that Western assistance is more closely 
linked to Jordan’s regional policies than its domestic politics, hence a 
modicum of restrictions and falsification of elections would pass 
unnoticed.  However, they also realize that overt restrictions of civil 
liberties would not fail to attract a negative reaction.192   
Therefore, external pressure could theoretically aid democratization by supplying rewards 
focused on domestic politics.  Consequently, the lack of conditions on aid and the priority 
of peace with Israel also permit the retreat of democracy without repercussion.  
Ironically, the retreat of democracy in Jordan has brought increased aid from the U.S. 
rather than a decrease.   
E. THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO FURTHER POLITICAL 
LIBERALIZATION 
Despite the roll-back and the tactical nature of the democratization process it is 
significant to analyze how the Jordanian military would react to increased political 
liberalization.  Thus far it has been explained that due to the nature of the pact between 
the monarchy and the military, the military is unlikely to react violently as long as the 
perquisites continue unabated.  An additional factor is the nature of the democratization 
process which has limited the potential for significant gains in political power for the 
Palestinians and the Islamists.   
It is unlikely the Jordanian military would react similar to the Algerian military’s 
response in 1992.  First, the gerrymandering and control over political parties in Jordan 
limit the extent to which the opposition can attain a majority in elections.  More 
importantly, the Algerian military plays a much more prominent role in Algerian politics 
than the Jordanian military.  Furthermore, the Algerian military did not have the financial 
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incentive to refrain from intervention.  While declining oil revenues in the 1980’s created 
the financial crisis in both Algeria and Jordan, security assistance to Jordan enabled the 
continuation of the rentier economy and benefits to the military.  The Algerian military 
did not have the same comfort, thus the military expenditure encountered a period of 
decline.  The benefits enjoyed by the Algerian military were dependent on their power 
status and control over the political system, thus the threat that the Islamists posed to the 
military was real.  The lack of a pact with the military elites and the Islamists created a 
situation of extreme vulnerability for the Algerian military following the 1991 
parliamentary elections.  Conversely, the Jordanian military stayed in the barracks 
throughout their process of democratization partially because they were bought off but 
also because the elections did not threaten their status or benefits due to the cooptation of 
the Islamists.  However, the Jordanian military’s involvement in quashing domestic riots 
reveals that domestic instability is a valid threat and justifiable for intervention.  This also 
demonstrates that the military is not completely withdrawn from political intervention.  
Thus, democratization controlled by the monarchy does not threaten the regime nor the 
military due to their co-dependence.   
Potentially the greatest threat to the Jordanian regime is an alliance between the 
military and the Islamists.  Through Islam, the Islamist party could potentially unify the 
Palestinians and Jordanians.  As the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Islamic Action Front's platform stands for supporting the military and reinforcing the 
unity between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians.193  Unique to Jordan, the 
Muslim Brotherhood supports the Hashemite regime instead of rallying opposition 
against it.  However, the Brotherhood once dominated by ethnic Jordanians is becoming 
increasingly Palestinian and less sympathetic to the monarchy's alliance with the United 
States and normalization movement with Israel.194  To counter this potential unification, 
the regime uses divide and rule tactics by fueling animosity between groups.  
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Furthermore, in an effort to depoliticize the military, they are not allowed to participate in 
political parties.195    
A military coup is unlikely as long as the military continues to benefit financially 
from the Hashemite monarchy.  Should security assistance halt or should an economic 
crisis result that affects military benefits, the chances for a coup would be greater.  The 
question of the military committing to democratic institutions is another issue.  Thus far, 
democratization seems to be a ploy to keep the monarchy in tact and arguably to sustain 
external rents.  Therefore, democracy does not threaten the regime because it is tactically 
controlled by the regime to prevent a snowball effect and it will not threaten the military 
since King Abdullah needs the backing of the military to remain in power. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The lack of civil-military relations in Jordan is a result of state-driven 
democratization as a regime survival strategy.  Democratic consolidation or even a 
constitutional monarchy, based on the model of the UK, do not appear to be true goals of 
Jordan.  Security assistance has successfully provided regime security and will continue 
to do so at the expense of political liberalization or a viable democratization process in 
Jordan.  Risa Brooks writes, “Political liberalisation – and democratisation – can only 
proceed so far before challenging the military’s institutional and financial 
prerogatives.”196  True military professionalism could weaken the main pillar of the 
regime by threatening the Jordanian character of the military and it would weaken the 
coercive capability to counter domestic opposition. 
Military aid that focuses on internal security, maintains the preferential treatment 
of ethnic Jordanians, and indirectly represses civil society, counteracts the promotion of 
democracy and in effect aids in the democratic retreat.  Security assistance does not 
promote democracy as that is not its intent.  Through the promotion of stability and 
security, the regime is guarded by the Jordanian led military, which indirectly enables a 
top-down democratization approach that threatens neither the regime nor the political role 
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and composition of the military.  With regime security of paramount focus it is exclusive 
and contradictory to attempt professionalization of the military and democratization. 
A military pact can aid democratization, however not unless the military 
transforms the structure and policy to promote professionalism and comply with civilian 
control.  Security assistance has worked thus far as a pact to constrain the military from 
attempting a coup or acting out against liberalization.  However, without restructuring the 
military through contestation, it would still be at risk during further liberalization.  The 
military must give loyalty to the system and institution of democracy and not just the 
regime or the bribe for democracy to be successful.  Thus, the current military pact is 
incomplete.  The cooptation of the Islamists through the National Charter accepted 
Hashemite legitimacy and ironically, by approving the Charter, the oppositionists also 
accepted the absence of a framework to achieve improved civil-military relations.  This 
deficiency of civil-military relations is thus institutionalized in the National Charter, 
therefore making any such modification more complex.  Furthermore, any deliberation 
over military privileges would cross the “red line” imposed by the state and consequently 
any transformation is unlikely in the near future.   
Although the democratization process may be gradual, it is unlikely for true 
professionalism to take place if it threatens regime security.  The current pact provides 
more of a hindrance than a buttress for democratization.  If other aspects of democracy in 
society are not successful such as civil society, free, fair, and regular elections, and liberal 
rights, how can civil-military relations be expected to reform successfully?  The “peace 
dividend” has thus provided legitimacy for the status quo rather than the promotion of 
democratization.  Diamond writes,  
In the end, the military threat to democracy will not be permanently 
contained without other changes that improve the effectiveness of 
democratic institutions and the depth of popular involvement with, and 
commitment to, them.  While causality may be reciprocal and intertwined, 
ultimately, civilian supremacy and democratic legitimacy go hand in 
hand.197   
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If democratization in Jordan is truly tactical and defensive due to political economy 
constraints and regime survival concerns it is unlikely to continue along the road towards 
democracy.   
This analysis does not mean that democracy cannot take hold in Jordan in the 
future; however the lack of negotiations on civil-military relations will delay the process 
and aid the retreat of democracy until these issues are brought to the fore.  If military aid 
continues to flow in increasing levels, there is even less motivation to restructure the 
military and transform the mission.  The regime appears unwilling to make these 






























Jordan as a moderate, pro-west, Arab nation receives scant attention that it fails to 
attain a more liberal form of governance.  Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy 
increasingly promoted democracy throughout with world while eschewing such policy in 
the Middle East.  Slowly, the current administration raised the expectations for political, 
economic, and educational reform in the Middle East through the Millennium Challenge 
Account and the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative.  In the past, the hypocrisy of 
U.S. foreign policy was quite evident with democracy promotion a primary foreign policy 
goal, while foreign policy in the Middle East was framed in “stability,” peaceful relations 
with Israel, and continuous access to oil.  Although it appears the U.S. State Department 
developed the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative to reconcile this hypocrisy, 
democracy promotion remains clouded by other U.S. security and economic interests.  
Currently, since security assistance strives to bolster the Hashemite regime 
whenever there is a potential crisis it removes the opportunity for the monarchy to deal 
with a crisis and eliminates the prospect of reform.  This relationship receives little 
attention due to Jordan's alignment with the United States and relative to its neighbors 
Jordan is far less authoritarian.  Furthermore, the lack of reform is overshadowed by 
Israeli security, regional stability, the war on terrorism, and fears of Islamist political 
parties.  
Despite calls for a professional military in Jordan, conversely it has become more 
praetorian.  In order to become more professional, reforms must remove the ethnic 
division and political nature of the Jordanian armed forces.  Dominance of key leadership 
positions in the military by ethnic Jordanians perpetuates a system where origin 
determines loyalty and thus trumps performance.  U.S. security assistance provides the 
finances and weaponry for private and corporate perquisites that primarily benefit ethnic 
Jordanians in a nation where Palestinians comprise approximately two-thirds of the 
population.  Therefore, these finances maintain elite political-military privilege to ethnic 
Jordanians where tribal alliances have diminished. 
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The bolstering of the Jordanian character of the military presents many civil-
military challenges.  Military aid strengthens the internal security role of the military 
rather than an external role, which is necessary for a more professional force.  
Additionally, this solidifies the second-class status of Palestinians and even portrays them 
as the fifth column despite their loyalty during periods of instability.  Currently, security 
assistance upholds a pact that simply attains loyalty to, and protection of, the regime.  
Furthermore, since the regime is dependent on foreign aid and military loyalty for 
survival it is unlikely to take the necessary steps to truly professionalize the military and 
commit it to civilian oversight.  Consequently, these challenges must be addressed in 
order to truly promote democracy and eliminate the defensive nature of democratization 
in Jordan.    
This phenomenon of supporting autocratic leaders when it is in U.S. security 
interests is certainly not new.  The United States is often criticized for abandoning the 
promotion of liberal democratic ideals when it is convenient.  Most recently, the global 
war on terrorism led the United States to increase aid to authoritarian regimes throughout 
the Middle East and Asia.  As Thomas Carothers notes, there may be an institutional 
divide between the State Department and the Department of Defense that inhibits the 
ability to balance democracy promotion and national security needs.198  While the State 
Department is actively promoting the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, the 
Pentagon is primarily concerned with more tactical goals of basing rights in foreign 
countries.  Rarely does the Department of Defense actively promote democracy.  Of note, 
U.S. Southern Command is the only unified command that has democracy promotion as 
one of its main missions.199  Therefore, demanding change and reform in Jordan as well 
as other Middle East nations may also require reform of the U.S. foreign policy approach 
to security assistance and democracy promotion. 
There are three main policy options for the United States to confront the issue of 
providing aid to nations, such as Jordan, that bolsters the incumbent leader rather than 
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promoting reform.  The first option is to maintain the current course regarding security 
assistance policy.  The second option would be to cease or significantly reduce aid 
transfers to foreign nations.  The third option would be to dramatically modify and 
reform the security assistance program in order to harmonize the promotion of regional 
stability and democratic reform. 
The status quo option brought us where we are today and does not offer a valid 
solution to combat the democratic retreat.  This option would allow the United States to 
continue aiding foreign nations regardless of whether democratic reform takes place.  
This may be the most flexible for changing U.S. national interests and beneficial in the 
short run, however in the long run the first option is a failed solution. 
The second option of ceasing foreign aid does not offer a significant improvement 
to the status quo.  If stability of the Hashemite monarchy is the intended goal of security 
assistance, it is likely that the democratic retreat is simply an unintended consequence.  
This does not signify that foreign aid to Jordan must be terminated in order to resolve the 
problem.  Jordan remains an important ally in the Middle East region due to their military 
and intelligence cooperation with the United States.  Furthermore, due to Jordan's 
proximity to, and peaceful relations with Israel, Jordanian stability will remain a primary 
goal of U.S. foreign policy.  Simply halting foreign aid payments would create massive 
instability in Jordan.  The military would likely turn on the monarchy and the Islamists 
would attempt to capitalize on the chaos by unifying opposition forces.  Rather than 
allowing this mass instability to play into the hands of the Islamists, the United States 
should reform the security assistance program so that it may provide stability and 
promote democracy concurrently.  
As the United States makes a strong appeal for democracy in Palestine and Iraq it 
continues to ignore the failed reform efforts of the pro-west Arab nations.  If the United 
States truly wishes to promote political, economic, and educational reform in the Middle 
East, these countries should be the example rather than the exception.  Therefore, beyond 
creating the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, the United States must reform the 
security assistance program as well if it truly desires political reform in the Middle East.  
Without reforming the security assistance program, U.S. aid will continue to bolster the 
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status quo and the Jordanian monarchy will continue to use divide and rule tactics 
between the Palestinians and Jordanians in order to maintain legitimacy. 
The prescribed method for harmonizing the promotion of regional stability and 
democratic reform is the third option, to reform security assistance and establish a 
conditional foreign aid program.  This would transform how recipient nations would use 
the finances and furthermore, it would demonstrate that the United States is serious about 
political reform in the Middle East.  Currently, U.S. security assistance does not advocate 
reform, thus it cannot be expected to achieve it.  The retreat of democratization is likely 
to continue unless some degree of pressure or guidance is issued by the United States.  
Simply put, the Jordanian monarchy does not desire a more liberal political system that 
would undermine its authority is unlikely to liberalize further without some incentive.  
Thus, the United States should capitalize on Jordan's dependence on foreign aid and 
create conditional aid in order to assist political reform.   
Tomorrow's geopolitical landscape may provide the opportunity for changes in 
the U.S. security assistance program.  Assuming the United States goes to war with Iraq 
in the near future and succeeds in removing Saddam Hussein, the United States will need 
to revise the current security architecture throughout the entire Middle East region.  No 
longer will the United States need to support authoritarian governments in the region in 
order to contain Iraq.  By altering or removing the policy of supporting despotic regimes 
in the Middle East, it provides the opportunity to dismantle the rentier economic structure 
that permeates much of the region.  While most of these states rely on oil rents for 
revenue, Jordan continues to rely on foreign aid as a means to delay political reform.  
Furthermore, with regime change in Iraq, Jordan’s current role as a buffer between a 
belligerent Saddam Hussein and Israel will diminish.  The short-term instability that 
Jordan will face domestically during the war will be restored with a more secure eastern 
border and a more stable region.  Finally, the long-term stability effects of a more 
democratic government in Jordan may aid future reform elsewhere in the Middle East.  
Thus, with a new security environment in the region, it will provide the opportunity to 
actively promote political reform.   
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If the United States truly desires democratic reform, then security assistance 
would be linked to the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative.  Potentially, the 
Millennium Challenge Account could serve as a test bed to conditionalize all U.S. foreign 
aid.  With these modifications to the security assistance program, Jordan would continue 
to receive aid on the condition that the state moves forward on a self-instituted timeline 
that dictates political reform.  Even if this timeline moves in a slow, gradual manner, it 
would still be progress towards democratization as opposed to the reversal witnessed over 
the last decade.   
The reform of security assistance should also include a coherent vision from the 
U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense.  Currently, security assistance 
carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Defense Security 
and Cooperation Agency have distinct policy goals.  In order for conditional aid to 
succeed and for democratic reform to take root in the Middle East, the policy goals of the 
State Department and the Department of Defense should be reinforcing rather than 
diverging.   
Without the conditionality of security assistance there is simply no incentive to 
change the status quo in Jordan.  If the goal of security assistance in the Middle East is to 
create regional stability, democratic reform may be the most prudent option for long-term 
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